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Evaluating Trickle Down Charity
A SOLUTION FOR DETERMINING WHEN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AIMED AT REVITALIZING
AMERICA’S CITIES AND REGIONS IS REALLY
CHARITABLE
Matthew J. Rossman†
INTRODUCTION
Encouraging business creation and job growth by
providing direct financial support, technical assistance, and
other aid to private enterprises has become a nearly ubiquitous,
core component of revitalization strategies in communities of
every size and shape across America.1 There is good reason for
such a significant focus on this type of place-based economic
development.2 A favorable business climate within a place—be it
a neighborhood, a city, a region, or a country—is critical to its

† Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would
like to thank my colleagues Jonathan Entin, Paul Feinberg, Jessie Hill, Erik Jensen
and Ken Margolis at Case Western Reserve University School of Law for reviewing and
critiquing drafts of this article. I would also like to acknowledge the valuable research
assistance provided by Erin Davis and Virginia (Mimi) Woelper, and the early
brainstorming done on this topic with the law students in my Urban Development Lab:
Erin Davis, Jordan Graham, Yeheng (Tracy) Li, Rachel Hessler Lyons, and Mandy
McNabb. The contributions of all of the above helped make this a stronger piece and I
am truly grateful to them.
1 See, e.g., Louise Story, Lines Blur As Texas Gives Industries Bonanza, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/03/us/winners-andlosers-in-texas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (referring to a NEW YORK TIMES investigation
revealing that state and local governments across the country give incentives to private
businesses totaling $80 billion a year).
2 “Economic development” is commonly understood to mean the strategic
structuring, restructuring and/or growth of an economy to enhance the economic well-being
of people that live in a particular place. Economic Development Reference Guide, INT’L ECON.
DEV. COUNCIL (2005), http://www.iedconline.org/?p=ED_Reference_Guide. “Place-based”
economic development strategies are often distinguished from “people-based” economic
development strategies, with the former focused on improving the climate for business
within a place and the latter focused on improving access of individuals to economic
opportunities (whether or not those opportunities are located in the place in which they
reside). Randall Crane & Michael Manville, People or Place? Revisiting the Who Versus the
Where of Urban Development, 20 LAND LINES 2, 2, 7 (July 2008).
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sustainability.3 Places that foster the creation and growth of
businesses and startup companies create jobs at disproportionately
high rates.4 In turn, places that create jobs draw people, resources,
and vitality; those that lose jobs fail at those things.5 Relatively
recent market forces like globalization and increased technological
connectivity have only intensified the competition for sustainability
by increasing the field of places for businesses and jobs to locate
and the speed at which places become winners and losers.6
Notwithstanding perceptions of the American economy
as a free market, its government at all levels is a huge player
in fostering place-based economic development.7 Since the
middle part of the twentieth century, the federal government
has continuously, and with increasing frequency, rolled out
incentive programs benefitting private companies designed to
spur job creation and economic growth in certain American
communities—typically those suffering some form of economic
distress.8 During the same period, state and local governments,
3 See Eben Fodor, Relationship between Growth and Prosperity in the 100 Largest
U.S. Metropolitan Areas, FODOR & ASSOCIATES.COM, http://www.fodorandassociates.com/
Reports/Growth_&_Prosperity_in_US_MSAs.pdf (Dec. 2010) (examining the relationship
between growth and economic prosperity in the 100 largest U.S. metropolitan areas).
4 See
Frequently Asked Questions, SBA OFFICE OF ADVOCACY,
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_sept_2012.pdf (last updated Sept. 2012).
Studies of U.S. census data demonstrate that small businesses account for approximately
65% of all net new jobs created in the country. The number of net new jobs created in the
United States between 1980 and 2005 roughly equals the number of jobs created by start-up
companies; see also Kauffman Foundation-Funded U.S. Census Bureau Data Highlight
Importance of Business Startups to Job Creation in the U.S., EWING MARION KAUFFMAN
FOUND. (Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/kauffman-foundationfunded-us-census-bureau-data-highlight-importance-business-startups-1247741.htm.
5 See Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class, WASH. MONTHLY (May
2002), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0205.florida.html (describing
connection between growing cities and the ability to attract creative and
entrepreneurial young residents); see also JENNIFER S. VEY ET AL., THE BROOKINGS
INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, RESTORING PROSPERITY, THE STATE ROLE IN
REVITALIZING AMERICA’S OLDER INDUSTRIAL CITIES, (2007) (comparing American older
cities that are prospering with those that are not, and identifying economic stagnancy
as a critical factor in the condition of less prosperous cities).
6 See Robert I. Lerman & Stefanie R. Schmidt, An Overview of Economic, Social,
and Demographic Trends Affecting the US Labor Market, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, available at
http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/herman/reports/futurework/conference/trends/
Trendsintro.htm (Aug. 1999) (discussing globalization and its impact on US markets).
7 Story, supra note 1.
8 Major L. Clark & Radwan N. Saade, The Role of Small Business in Economic
Development of the United States: From the End of the Korean War (1953) to the Present
(Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy, Working Paper 2010), available at
http://www.sba.gov/advocacy/7540/12143 (describing the shift in federal economic
development policies in mid-twentieth century toward place-based development fueled by
small business creation); see also William H. Simon, The Community Economic
Development Movement, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 377, 380-87 (2002) (describing federal placebased economic development programs throughout the second half of the twentieth
century). Just a few examples include the Economic Development Administration of
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motivated less by equity and more by self-preservation, have
jumped into the economic development game with equal zeal
and creativity.9 State, county, and municipal legislatures have
equipped their governments with the capacity to extend an
ever-widening array of tax credits and abatements, grants, and
publicly financed or guaranteed loans to businesses large and
small in order to keep them within their political boundaries.10
More recently, another player, seemingly an even-less
likely character to foster private sector job creation, has risen to
prominence: the nonprofit sector. A new wave of nonprofit
organizations has emerged and is running venture capital funds,
recruiting companies to major metropolitan areas, providing
technical assistance to business owners, and in a multitude of
other ways facilitating targeted economic growth in urban,
suburban, and rural areas throughout the country.11 These
organizations, which this article refers to as “regional economic
development organizations” or “REDOs,” have begun to make a
significant impact on local and regional job growth in some
areas,12 and philanthropic and civic forces are increasingly
the 1960s (providing working capital loans to private companies in distressed regions
coupled with public infrastructure improvements), Empowerment Zones and Enterprise
Communities in the 1990s (offering packages of grants, regulatory waivers, tax-exempt
bonding, and other tax benefits to attract businesses within a select group of the nation’s
most severely distressed urban neighborhoods) and New Market Tax Credits begun in
first decade of twenty-first century (incentivizing investment by private investors in
businesses in low-income neighborhoods through offsetting tax credits).
9 Michael I. Luger, The Role of Local Government in Contemporary Economic
Development (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Working Paper 2007); Timothy J.
Bartik, Local Economic Development Policies, (Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, Working Paper 03-91, Jan. 2003).
10 See COUNCIL OF DEV. FIN. AGENCIES, http://www.cdfa.net/ (last visited Apr.
11, 2014) (cataloging programs within state, county, and municipal governments across
the country that provide or otherwise support economic development financing).
11 Research conducted by the author indicates that all 50 major metropolitan
areas in the United States (as determined by the United States Office of Budget and
Management) are home to a nonprofit organization the primary mission of which is regional
job creation through direct aid to for-profit businesses. A majority of the organizations
identified were formed since 2000. See ERIN DAVIS & MATTHEW J. ROSSMAN, REDOS BY
METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA (2013) (on file with author); see, e.g., ANN ARBOR SPARK,
http://www.annarborusa.org/
(last
visited
Apr.
11,
2014);
BIOCROSSROADS,
http://www.biocrossroads.com/Home.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2014); BIOGENERATOR,
http://www.biogenerator.org/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 11, 2014); THE BIZDOM,
http://bizdom.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2014); BRANDERY, http://brandery.org/ (last visited
Apr. 11, 2014); GREATER PHOENIX ECON. COUNCIL, http://www.gpec.org/home (last visited
Apr. 11, 2014); JUMPSTART, http://www.jumpstartinc.org; INVEST NEBRASKA CORP.,
http://www.investnebraska.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2014); PITTSBURGH LIFE SCIS.
GREENHOUSE, http://www.plsg.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
12 See, e.g., Message from Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Erskine, U.S.
ECON. DEV. ADMIN. (June 2013), www.eda.ogov/news/newsletters/2013/june.htm, (including
a claim by BioGenerator (St. Louis) that its investments in its portfolio companies
leveraged $110 million in outside investment in 2012); see also Reports, JUMPSTART,
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throwing their institutional and financial weight behind them.13 In
the wake of the “Great Recession” of 2008, REDOs have become a
darling of politicians and policy makers for engineering America’s
economic turnaround, as they represent a largely noncontroversial
blend of pro-business and anti-poverty objectives, while reinforcing
the country’s entrepreneurial self-image.14
Central to this article is the recognition that many REDOs
are operating not only as nonprofit organizations, but as
charities.15 By “charities,” I mean nongovernmental organizations
recognized by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.16 Section 501(c)(3)
provides powerful tax, funding, and reputational advantages to
charities. These include: (1) exemption from federal income tax
(and, by extension, from many other types of federal, state, and
local taxes and regulatory laws),17 (2) eligibility to receive
contributions that are tax-deductible by individual and corporate
donors from their federal income taxes,18 (3) eligibility for funding
from government and foundation sources that are either not
available to or harder to obtain for non-501(c)(3) organizations,19
and (4) the public credibility associated with having been
scrutinized by the IRS and recognized as a charity.20 Taken
www.jumpstartinc.org/results/reports.aspx (last visited Apr. 23, 2013) (study conducted
by Cleveland State University, Levin College of Urban Affairs showing early-stage
companies incubated by JumpStart (Cleveland) generated $270 million in economic
benefit for Ohio in 2012).
13 See
THE FOUND. CTR., SPOTLIGHT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
GRANTMAKING IN OHIO (Mar. 2011), http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/
pdf/spotlight_ohio_2011.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) (showing that in Ohio alone, in
2008, grant awards from the state’s largest foundations to economic development
organizations totaled $61.8 million dollars, a 152% increase from 4 years earlier).
14 See, e. g., Fact Sheet: White House Launches “Startup America” Initiative,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/startup-america-fact-sheet.
15 See DAVIS & ROSSMAN, supra note 11 (showing that 49 out of 50 of the
metropolitan statistical areas surveyed are home to a REDO recognized as a charity
under Section 501(c)(3) and that in the one outlier, Las Vegas, plans are in place to
begin a 501(c)(3) REDO); see also I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3) (2012).
16 I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3).
17 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) provides federal income tax exemption for organizations
described, including those organizations organized and operated exclusively for charitable
purposes. Many states and municipalities provide automatic exemption from state and local
tax to all organizations that are described in § 501(c)(3). In other states and municipalities,
organizations must file additional paperwork and/or establish additional facts in order to be
exempted from applicable income tax.
18 I.R.C. § 170 (2010).
19 BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 49 (10th ed.
2011); MARILYN E. PHELAN AND ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS LAW
AND POLICY 169 (3rd ed. 2003).
20 James J. Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan and Recent Developments in the
Nonprofit Landscape: A Need for New Legal Approaches, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 580
(2008) (“Traditionally, the recognition of exemption letter has been a seal of approval
for foundations and other donors.”).
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together, these advantages amount to a substantial public
subsidy that incentivizes philanthropic activity.
The law reserves this subsidy for entities that are
organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes,
which requires, among other things, serving public “rather
than” private interests.21 Known as the private benefit doctrine,
this requirement reflects a long-standing principle in the law
related to charities that, for an organization to merit the
“charitable subsidy,” the primary and direct beneficiaries of its
activities must be the members of a charitable class. Any
resulting benefit to private interests must be an incidental and
insignificant byproduct of serving this class.22
So what is the problem? Conceptually, the private
benefit doctrine would seem to exclude many forms of economic
development as charitable activity. Intrinsic to the work of
almost any organization engaged in economic development is
direct aid to for-profit businesses to generate private benefit
(and lots of it). In theory, if enough of these businesses
ultimately succeed, secondary public benefits like the creation
of jobs or the revitalization of a distressed community follow.
However, this represents a reversal of how the law defines
charity—it is privately owned businesses which are the
primary beneficiaries and the members of the charitable class
who benefit incidentally. Even at its most altruistic, economic
development is still “trickle down” charity.
Moreover, as the practice of charitable economic
development has become more geographically ambitious and
sophisticated, the relationship between the businesses aided
and the benefit to members of a charitable class has become
more attenuated and less predictable. REDOs exemplify this
trend. Consider, for example, a REDO that creates a venture
capital fund to invest in companies across a multi-county
region that has an unemployment rate above the national
average. How does one measure the private benefit
internalized by the companies and their founders versus the
public benefit enjoyed by the region as a whole and/or those
individuals experiencing the effects of unemployment? Does an
investment in a biotechnology company that may grow to
employ 40 to 50 highly educated individuals serve primarily to
benefit a disadvantaged region or the company’s founders and
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii)(2008).
Am. Campaign Academy v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1074 (1989). See I.R.S.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
21

22
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those employees? Does a loan to retain a business in a
suburban area 25 miles from the impoverished neighborhoods
of a region’s anchor city count as the type of “regional” public
benefit that accomplishes charitable ends?
Given the potential complexities associated with
squaring economic development activity with Section 501(c)(3),
one would assume that there is a careful and consistent
method for evaluating when a charity engages in work that
falls under the private benefit doctrine. Unfortunately, for this
purpose, the tax law’s standard analytic structure is
rudimentary and abstract. The IRS uses a largely intuitive, gut
reaction in making an initial determination about private
benefit when an organization applies for 501(c)(3) status and
thereafter pays virtually no attention to the organization’s
achievement of a sufficient public/private benefit balance.23
Although the standard practice may work well enough for
more conventional charities like soup kitchens and afterschool
programs, it is too blunt an instrument to adequately measure
and decipher the relationship between public and private benefit
generated by the activities of twenty-first century economic
development organizations. Considering that the private benefit
doctrine should be the critical factor in assessing when economic
development is charitable, the status quo is problematic.
The principal consequence is that a growing number of
economic development organizations take full advantage of the
significant tax and funding benefits and related goodwill
associated with 501(c)(3) status even though they are directing
aid to businesses and individuals who may be anything but
distressed, without demonstrating benefit to those considered
to be proper recipients of charity. Millions of tax-advantaged
dollars24 intended for charitable purposes flow to organizations
that are not accountable. Many economic development charities
are clearly accomplishing charitable purposes. But the lack of
accountability means that others are not, and yet are
benefitting from the charitable subsidy and, in some instances,
attracting funds that would otherwise support genuinely
charitable causes.25 The IRS has the responsibility to scrutinize
charities carefully in order to protect the integrity of the
charitable sector and prevent misuse of the substantial public
subsidy that the sector enjoys. Given that regions across the
23
24
25

See infra Part IV.A & C.
See e.g., THE FOUND. CTR., supra note 13.
See infra Part IV.D.
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country are utilizing REDOs at an increasing rate, the time is
ripe to address this problem.
This article examines the recent evolution of charitable
economic development, how the current jurisprudence and IRS
practices assess it, and how these could be changed to better
decipher when economic development is really charitable.
Ultimately, this article proposes that the IRS apply the private
benefit doctrine more carefully, consistently, and frequently to
economic development organizations claiming charitable status.
Part I briefly discusses the genesis and expansion of
charitable economic development. Parts II and III summarize
the law of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code as it
relates to private benefit generally and organizations engaged
in charitable economic development specifically. Part IV makes
a fuller case for why the current jurisprudence and the IRS do
not adequately assess and monitor charitable organizations
engaged in twenty-first century economic development and the
harm that results. Part V identifies a range of possible
solutions to this problem and considerations to bear in mind
when choosing among these solutions. Finally, Part VI sets
forth my recommended solution.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BY
AMERICAN CHARITIES

A.

An Overview

Briefly examining the history and evolution of placebased charitable economic development in the United States
aids in understanding why Section 501(c)(3) jurisprudence
relating to these organizations evolved as it did and why the
time is ripe for readdressing it.
Despite a popular perception of charity as acts of
compassion that meet the most basic needs of the poor, the
relationship between economic development—in the sense of
providing opportunities for gainful employment—and charity is
actually long-standing and deeply rooted in Anglo-American
culture.26 Charity connected to providing the mechanisms for
cultivating wealth reflects an intrinsic American value—that
promoting entrepreneurship and economic self-sufficiency
addresses the root cause of poverty rather than merely
26 Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of
America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2451 (2005).
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alleviating its symptoms.27 This is evidenced throughout the
history of American charity, from its early influence in the
ascetic Protestantism and industrious spirit of prominent
colonialist-era thinkers like Cotton Mather and Benjamin
Franklin, to the “friendly visitors” and “scientific philanthropy”
movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, all of which emphasized the promotion of work and
enterprise over indiscriminate almsgiving as the more
appropriate approach to meeting the needs of the poor.28
Also well-entrenched is the notion that economic
development has the potential to address the broader needs of
an entire community, rather than just the basic sustenance of
needy individuals. One early American example is the debate
between prominent black leaders Booker T. Washington and
W.E.B. DuBois around the turn of the nineteenth century over
the role of business ownership and economic independence
within the black community as a way of achieving political
enfranchisement and civil rights for recently emancipated
slaves.29 This concept has carried over and expanded greatly into
modern day movements like social entrepreneurship and venture
philanthropy which attempt to apply for-profit business models
and market-oriented solutions to societal challenges like
protecting the environment, eradicating urban food deserts, and
ensuring fair wages to low-income migrant workers.30 As for
economic development specifically aimed at revitalizing
geographically defined communities and implemented by
“charities,” it was the Community Economic Development (CED)
movement in the 1960s that brought this strategy to prominence.
B.

Community Economic Development

The genesis of CED was largely influenced by the
failure of the federal government’s partnership with municipal
agencies and private developers to satisfactorily revitalize
blighted American urban areas in the 1950s through the Urban

Id.
Id. at 2453-54.
29 Scott J. Cummings, Community Economic Development As Progressive
Politics: Toward a Grass-Roots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399,
410 (2001). See generally Jonathan L. Entin, Justice Thomas, Race, and the
Constitution Through the Lens of Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois, 88 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 755 (2011).
30 Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2437, 2472 (2009).
27
28
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Renewal program.31 Urban Renewal proved widely unpopular
and unsuccessful, in part because its top down approach to
planning and decision-making excluded those who resided in
the affected areas and often resulted in bulldozing wide swaths
of buildings occupied by low-income and minority residents and
replacing them with commercial buildings or vacant lots.32
In its place came the federal Economic Opportunity Act of
1964 and the Community Action Program (and later the Special
Impact Program) which instead delegated governmental
authority and funding for a wide range of community
improvement activities to “community action programs”
organized within distressed communities and involving
“maximum flexible participation” by community residents.33 This
model, which was based on a template previously funded by the
Ford Foundation through its Gray Areas program, came to be
known as Community Economic Development.34 The need for
local organizational actors as vehicles to carry out CED gave rise
to the creation of community development corporations (CDCs).35
CDCs were typically established as charitable 501(c)(3)
corporations empowered to meet a broad range of a distressed
community’s needs. These needs might include acquiring and
rehabilitating blighted buildings, developing affordable
housing, managing community-based health centers and credit
unions, and overseeing the local delivery of social services and
other public aid programs.36 An important subset of many
CDCs’ activities also included local economic development as a
mechanism for creating economic activity and jobs within the
community.37 Early CDCs provided loans, loan guarantees, and
31 Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones, What is Community Economic
Development?, in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS, 5-11 (Roger A. Clay Jr. &
Susan R. Jones, eds. 2009) (discussing the history and background of community
economic development); see Brian Glick & Matthew J. Rossman, Neighborhood Legal
Services as House Counsel to Community-Based Efforts to Achieve Economic Justice: The
East Brooklyn Experience, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 105, 107 (1997).
32 Simon, supra note 8; see also David J. Barron, The Community Economic
Development Movement: A Metropolitan Perspective, 56 STAN L. REV. 701, 706-08 (2003) (noting
that tenants and homeowners already in place often fared poorly under Urban Renewal).
33 See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 201, 78 Stat.
508 (1964) (repealed 1981).
34 Clay & Jones, supra note 31, at 7.
35 Id.
36 See Cummings, supra note 29, at 438-41; Glick & Rossman, supra note
31, at 107-08.
37 Glick & Rossman, supra note 31, at 109; see Cummings, supra note 29 at
401-08; Michael Schill, Assessing the Role of Community Development Corporations in
Inner-City Economic Development, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 753, 768 (1997)
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stock purchases as specialized financing for businesses and
cooperatives owned by community members who did not meet
the lending standards of conventional lenders.38 They developed
retail centers to provide local shopping and other amenities in
places conventional developers would not touch.39 Occasionally
they even owned and operated local companies (usually with
the intention that stock in these companies would be made
available to employees and local residents).40
There was little question that community economic
development qualified as charitable economic development even
though it aided for-profit businesses. The missions of CDCs
revolved around the re-development of relatively small and
geographically distinct neighborhoods in heightened states of
distress due to high rates of poverty, blight, and deterioration.41
CED is a comprehensive approach, addressing a wide range of
causes and complications of poverty, and, thus, the particular
activities a CDC undertook were necessarily tied to the needs of
the community it served.42 In other words, when CDCs engaged
in economic development, it was in response to an identified
need of a distressed community. Adding credibility to this
assessment was the fact that the leadership of CDCs, by
design, was largely composed of, sought input from, and was
ultimately accountable to the residents and other stakeholders
of the poor and distressed communities they served.43 As Part
III of this article later explains, the IRS rulings that continue to
govern the agency’s approach to charitable economic development

(“[O]ne objective common to virtually all CDCs is the desire to generate economic
opportunity and jobs for the residents of their communities.”).
38 COLEMAN ET AL., THE NATIONAL HOUSING & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
LAW PROJECT, A LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON COMMUNITY-BASED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
15-17 (1974).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See Cummings, supra note 29, at 415-16 (discussing the roots of modern
CDCs in distressed urban neighborhoods); Barron, supra note 32, at 714.
42 NEAL R. PIERCE & CAROL F. STEINBACH, CORRECTIVE CAPITALISM: THE
RISE OF AMERICA’S COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 20-21 (1987); Ben
Quinones, Serving Clients in New Ways: Community Economic Development, CED on
the Job, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 773, 773-74 (1993).
43 See Anna Clark, Welcome to Your New Government: Can Non-Profits Run
Cities?, FOREFRONT (Next Am. City, Phila., PA), at 1, http://nextcity.org/forefront/view/
welcome-to-your-new-government (“[T]he key way that CDCs establish themselves as
representatives of their community is by allotting a certain number of seats on their board
to residents.”); see also NAT’L CONG. FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV., Reaching New Heights: Trends
and Achievements of Community-Based Development Organizations, NAT’L CONG. FOR
CMTY. ECON. DEV. 4, 7 (2005), http://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.communitywealth.org/files/downloads/report-ncced.pdf.
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were handed down in the 1970s, when nonprofit economic
development organizations were predominantly CDCs.44
Despite the eventual demise in the 1970s of the federal
programs that gave rise to them, CDCs proved to be very
resilient and are now a pervasive component of strategies for
addressing the needs of both low and moderate income
communities throughout the country.45 While many still operate
under the guise of a traditional CDC located in storefronts in the
center of the neighborhoods they serve, these days an
increasingly complex network of financial intermediaries,
technical assistance providers, and national foundations help to
facilitate CED. CDCs themselves have taken on more
complicated structures and activities, particularly in the economic
development arena.46 Even so, CED is still viewed primarily as a
poverty alleviation and blight amelioration strategy confined to
distressed areas and, thus, as firmly charitable.47
C.

Regional Economic Development

The emergence of CED in the 1960s did not represent an
abdication of place-based economic development by other
interests. As described in the Introduction, the government has
played an ever-increasing role in promoting place-based
economic development.48 Another set of stakeholders includes
businesses (especially those headquartered in a community),
local foundations, and nonprofit institutions (like hospitals, the
arts, universities, and schools) that have “sticky capital” in a
community.49 In some instances, these stakeholders are well
Infra Part III.
According to a 2005 census, the number of CDCs nationally had grown
from approximately 100 in the 1960s to approximately 4,600 in 2005. Reaching New
Heights, supra note 43 at 8. There are CDCs in urban and rural areas in all 50 states
with diverse programs and objectives. Dana A. Thompson, The Role of Nonprofits in
CED, in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 58 (Roger A. Clay, Jr. &
Susan R. Jones, eds. 2009).
46 See Reaching New Heights, supra note 43, at 19-20 (noting that the
community development field began to attract new money from state and local
governments, foundations, banks, corporations, and religious organizations, which are
helping to drive the field forward); see also Schill, supra note 37, at 753 (describing the
various roles CDCs are playing in economic development: development catalyst,
developer/landlord and equity investor in business enterprises).
47 See generally Cummings, supra note 29.
48 Supra INTRODUCTION; see generally VEY ET AL., supra note 5.
49 See VEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 40-41. “Sticky Capital” is a phrase used
frequently by Ted Howard of the Democracy Collaborative to describe investments in a
community that are unlikely to “get up and leave” to another part of the country.
Examples include college campuses, hospitals, and nonprofit foundations that have a
44

45
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integrated in localized CED strategies spearheaded by a CDC.50
However, increasingly more often over the past few decades,
these stakeholders are also or instead involved in broader efforts
to address economic development across a city, a region, or even
an entire state carried out by independent nongovernmental,
nonprofit organizations.51 It is these organizations that this
article categorizes as regional economic development
organizations (REDOs).
The rise in REDOs is attributable to several factors,
three of which are emphasized here. The first is the more
formalized role that the so-called corporate elite began to play
in urban economic planning and development beginning in the
1980s in cities across the country. Nestled within any
American city of a significant size is a network of business,
political, and other institutional leaders whose professional
interests are closely linked to local development and growth,
and who have the means and influence to impact it.52 One
commentator has coined this network the “growth machine.”53
While informally influential from the times these cities
first emerged, the growth machine in many of America’s
eastern and midwestern cities also began to coalesce in the
1980s into nonprofit organizations set up for the specific
purpose of counteracting the impact on these cities caused by
the decline in manufacturing and heavy industry.54 From
Cleveland to Charlotte and Hartford to Kansas City, the
leaders of those companies that profited when times were good
entered
into
public-private
partnerships
with
local
governments and foundations to draw up and implement
blueprints for economic survival and retrenchment, as well as

long history in a particular community. See, e.g., Ted Howard & Steve Dubb,
Leveraging Anchor Institutions for Local Job Creation and Wealth Building, in BIG
IDEAS FOR JOBS (Berkeley Institute for Research on Labor & Employment ed., 2012),
available at www.irle.berkeley.edu/research/jobcreation/howard_2011ppt.
50 Reaching New Heights, supra note 43, at 7 (discussing CDCs as
organizations, showing a chart of CDC’s service areas and noting that two-thirds of
CDCs have a distinctly local focus).
51 See VEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 68.
52 See generally BUSINESS ELITES AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: CASE STUDIES
AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Scott Cummings ed. 1988).
53 See Harvey Molotch, Strategies and Constraints of Growth Elites, in
BUSINESS ELITES AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: CASE STUDIES AND CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 25 (Scott Cummings ed. 1988).
54 Patricia Atkins et al., Responding to Manufacturing Job Loss: What Can
Economic Development Policy Do, BROOKINGS METROPOLITAN POL’Y PROGRAM (2011).
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physical redevelopment.55 This model of economic development
has persisted and expanded throughout the country, buoyed by
an infusion of public and philanthropic dollars.56 In most cases,
these coalitions now include a widening array of partners
including representatives from hospitals, universities,
foundations, and new and emerging businesses.57
A second factor is the broadening range of circumstances
in which regions are utilizing REDOs. Communities are no
longer “hold[ing] off on pursuing economic development
strategies until the bottom falls out of the local economy”; they
are taking a longer-range view of economic development and
pursuing preventative strategies to ward off economic decline
before it starts to take hold.58 Economic development has become
a matter of significant public concern and focus, regardless of
whether a region is poor, affluent, or somewhere in between.59
Third, there is a growing consensus among those who
practice and analyze local economic development that the
individual economies of small geographic areas like
neighborhoods and even cities are less relevant in the face of
globalization. Local political boundaries are less relevant
because metropolitan regions must compete for jobs and
companies on a global basis.60 The notion that one neighborhood
or municipality within a larger region “wins” by attracting a
business from an adjoining neighborhood or municipality is
rapidly being replaced by the belief that each region must
identify and coordinate its distinctive strengths and assets if it
55 Id.; David O. Renz, The Case of Kansas City, in PHILANTHROPY AND THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA (Charles T. Clotfetter & Thomas
Ehrlich, eds. 2001).
56 See, e.g., THE FOUND. CTR., supra note 13.
57 Ted Howard & Steve Dubb, Leveraging Anchor Institutions for Local Job
Creation and Wealth Building, in BIG IDEAS FOR JOBS (Berkeley Institute for Research
on Labor & Employment ed., 2012).
58 Tomer J. Inbar, Charities and Economic Development, in GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAM ON REPRESENTING AND
MANAGING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.morganlewis.com/
pubs/inbar_georgetown06-economicdevel.pdf.
59 See Growing Your Region’s Economy with Small Businesses and Entrepreneurs,
NAT’L ASS’N OF DEV. ORGS. RESEARCH FOUND. (Dec. 2011), http://www.nado.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/rlf2012.pdf (stating that there are over 500 regional economic
development organizations in the U.S. that are composed principally of local
governmental officials and charged generally with developing and implementing regional
economic development policies). These organizations cover virtually every section of the
United States. 2011 RDO Organizational Data Profiles, NAT’L ASS’N OF DEV. ORGS. 4
http://www.nado.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/2011-National-Profiles-of-RDOsFINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
60 Claire Felbinger & James Rohey, Globalization’s Impact on State and
Local Policy: The Rise of Regional Cluster Based Economic Development Strategies, 18
REV. POL’Y RESEARCH 63, 64-79 (2001).
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hopes to survive in an era when jobs and capital can easily find
lower cost alternatives in other regions or countries.61 In this way,
economic development must extend beyond the boundaries of
highly distressed communities if it is to make a sustainable impact.
D.

What Are REDOs and What Do They Do?

While REDOs resemble CDCs in encouraging and
facilitating place-based economic development, they differ in
significant ways. CDCs typically serve relatively confined areas
with high concentrations of poverty: a poor neighborhood or
cluster of neighborhoods in urban settings, or a larger
contiguous poor area in rural settings where there is less
population density.62 REDOs, on the other hand, normally serve
one or more contiguous metropolitan areas in urban settings, or
an area as large as an entire state in rural settings.63 The service
area of a REDO usually contains multiple sub-communities that
are faring differently in terms of economic health, household
income, individual educational attainment, and other
demographics that reflect an area’s relative wealth.64
Accordingly, REDOs serve an area large enough that they
include sections that are distressed, some that are prosperous,
and others that fall somewhere in between.65
CDCs address a comprehensive range of needs within a
community, including economic development,66 while REDOs
focus exclusively on economic development.67 The leadership of
a CDC typically represents a broad cross-section of stakeholders
in the community it serves and is elected by community
residents.68 REDOs, on the other hand, are typically governed by
61 Mark
Drabensott, Rethinking Federal Policy For Regional Economic
Development, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY ECON. REV. (2006), http://www.kc.frb.org/
publicat/econrev/PDF/1q06drab.pdf.
62 See Reaching New Heights, supra note 43, at 7-8; see also THOMPSON,
supra note 45, at 58.
63 See, e.g., GREATER PHOENIX ECONOMIC COUNCIL, supra note 11 (serving
23 communities including and surrounding Phoenix, AZ); JUMPSTART,
http://www.jumpstartinc.org/aboutus/whatwedo.aspx (2014) (serving 21 counties of
Northeast Ohio); INVEST NEBRASKA CORP., www.investnebraska.com/about-us/whomwe-serve/ (2014) (service area includes entire state of Nebraska).
64 See, e.g., Mapping Poverty in America, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2014)
http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2014/01/05/poverty-map/. (mapping the diversity
in wealth of the areas served by the REDOs cited in preceding footnote).
65 See, e.g., Mapping Poverty in America, supra note 64.
66 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
67 See, e.g., GREATER PHOENIX ECONOMIC COUNCIL, http://www.gpec.org/
about-us; JUMPSTART, http://www.jumpstartinc.org/aboutus.aspx; BIOGENERATOR,
http://www.biogenerator.org/ (2014).
68 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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self-perpetuating boards consisting largely of business leaders
and economic development experts, many of whom are not
directly accountable to those who live within the region.69
To provide a better sense of what REDOs do and the
context in which they do it, brief descriptions of three
hypothetical REDOs are set forth below. These descriptions
closely mirror types of REDOs that are being utilized with
increasing frequency by communities across the country and are
often recognized by the IRS as charities.70
1. The Business Accelerator71
This organization is located in a large city in an area of
the country that is considered economically depressed. The city
is afflicted by many indicators of distress, including blighted
and abandoned properties, high unemployment rates, high
crime, and low high school and college graduation rates among
its residents. The Business Accelerator seeks to help grow the
economic base not only in the city but also in its surrounding
region by assisting entrepreneurs leading high growth
potential companies across the entire 15 county region that
surrounds the city. This type of organization operates under
the premise that, by helping local entrepreneurs get through
the early stages when many companies fail, more companies
will get off the ground, expand, and remain in the region, and
thus expand local job opportunities.
The Business Accelerator’s largest program activity
involves making seed capital investments in early-stage ideas
and small companies to help them grow to a point where they
can bring their products and services to market and attract more
conventional sources of financing. Once it makes an investment,
the Business Accelerator matches the company with one of its
“entrepreneurs in residence” to help guide the company’s
leadership during the term of the Business Accelerator’s
investment. The Business Accelerator’s other services include
connecting entrepreneurs to other sources of capital and
providing low cost or no cost technical assistance to business
See, e.g., GREATER PHOENIX ECONOMIC COUNCIL, supra note 67;
(2014), http://www.jumpstartinc.org/aboutus.aspx; BIOGENERATOR (2014),
http://www.biogenerator.org/.
70 See Davis & Rossman, supra note 11, for a representative list of REDOs, all of
which the IRS has determined to be 501(c)(3) organizations operating for charitable purposes.
71 The organization described as The Business Accelerator resembles
JumpStart, Inc., based in Cleveland, Ohio. See JUMPSTART, supra note 11.
69

JUMPSTART
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owners on issues like public relations and marketing, identifying
and attracting employees with the right skills, commercializing a
technology, generating sales, achieving milestones, and most
other issues that a startup business would face.
The Business Accelerator receives its financial support
from a wide range of regionally based charitable foundations
and individual and corporate donors, as well as from state
government. Its board of directors consists primarily of local
business leaders, who are themselves usually successful
entrepreneurs, with some representatives from civic
organizations and government.
2. The Biotech Incubator72
This organization is located in a region that, while not
technically economically depressed, has stagnant job growth
rates and an aging economic base typified by companies
founded and headquartered in the region many decades ago
that no longer provide the number of jobs they once did. The
Biotech Incubator’s mission is to facilitate the formation of
science, research-based, and technology companies to support
new economic development and job growth in the region. The
organization was established and is funded and overseen by
local business, research, and university leaders who decided to
draw upon the region’s historic universities and research
institutions to re-position the region against increasing
domestic and global competition for new companies and
talented young workers.
The Biotech Incubator engages in several types of
activities specifically tailored to incubating new biotech
companies. The organization works closely with regional
universities and research institutions to identify promising ideas,
technologies, and inventions, and to educate the associated
researchers and entrepreneurs about commercialization and
business development possibilities. It provides additional
assistance to promising candidates through business plan
development and, in some cases, serves as part of a new
company’s management team during its early phases. The
organization helps companies it works with to identify, apply
for, and communicate with providers of promising sources of
capital, while also working to attract venture capital funds to
72 The
organization described as The Biotech Incubator
BioGenerator, based in St. Louis, MO. See BIOGENERATOR, supra note 11.
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the region. Finally, the Biotech Incubator operates “Accelerator
Labs,” which consist of wet laboratory and office space that it
makes available to early-stage companies at below market
rates or for free (under some circumstances). These labs allow
the companies to focus on demonstrating the viability of their
technology by defraying the early stage costs of purchasing
equipment and renting laboratory space.
3. The Regional Business Advocate73
This organization is located in a region of the country
that is experiencing both economic and population growth,
anchored by a city that is already prosperous, but positioning
itself to grow. The Regional Business Advocate seeks to
cultivate industries that bring high-quality, high-wage jobs to
the city and its surrounding counties, with a specialized focus
on attracting renewable energy and international companies.
It carries out this mission through three primary and
closely related categories of activities. The first is business
development. The organization participates in efforts to lure
companies and jobs to relocate to the region by helping connect
prospective companies and governmental agencies that are
sources of tax credits and other relocation assistance,
promoting legislative strategies for adopting business-friendly
devices like renewable energy tax credits, and hosting company
and industry leaders on trips to the region. The second is
marketing. The organization creates films, websites, and other
materials promoting the region to show to chief executives and
site selection consultants of companies seeking to relocate.
Third, the organization identifies industries that have
significant potential for growth in the region, and produces
reports on how to target and grow these industries.
In many ways, the Regional Business Advocate acts like
an economic development division of local government. But it is
an independent organization, with roughly equal amounts of
public and private funding, and a board of directors that
consists of a combination of business leaders, government
officials, and heads of universities and local foundations.

73 The organization described as The Regional Business Advocate resembles
The Greater Phoenix Economic Council based in Phoenix, AZ. See GREATER PHOENIX
ECONOMIC COUNCIL, supra note 11.
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ESSENTIALS OF SECTION 501(C)(3)

Many REDOs operate as charities,74 which is to say that
the IRS recognizes them as qualifying for tax exemption under
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.75 Qualifying
under Section 501(c)(3) is the principal step for a nonprofit
organization to access the substantial public subsidy available
to charities.76 Before discussing how the IRS applies Section
501(c)(3) to economic development, it is important to
understand some of the basic components of Section 501(c)(3),
with an emphasis on those that relate to the definition of
“charitable” and the private benefit doctrine.
A.

Eligibility for 501(c)(3) Status

All organizations described within the 29 subcategories
of Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code are exempt from
federal income tax.77 The largest and most well-known
subcategory is Section 501(c)(3).78 Included within Section
501(c)(3) are “[c]orporations . . . organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific . . . or educational
purposes . . . .”79 Although each of these terms has a distinct
definition under 501(c)(3),80 each overlaps with the definition of
charitable and, in fact, almost all organizations seeking
501(c)(3) status for place-based economic development work
seek to justify their activities as furthering “charitable”
purposes.81 For simplicity’s sake, this article refers to any
economic development conducted by a 501(c)(3) organization as
“charitable economic development.”
See Davis & Rossman, supra, note 11.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
76 See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
77 I.R.C. § 501(c).
78 AMY S. BLACKWOOD ET AL., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC
CHARITIES, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING, 2012, 1-2 (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.urban.org/
publications/412674.html (documenting that in 2010 there were 1.6 million
organizations registered with the IRS under section 501(c), nearly 1.1 million of which
were recognized as 501(c)(3) organizations).
79 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (emphasis added). There are other categories of purposes
listed in section 501(c)(3), but they are more obscure and not related to the topic at hand.
80 I.R.S. Pub. 557, 46573C (Oct. 2013).
81 See generally JANE C. NOBER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A LEGAL GUIDE
FOR GRANTMAKERS 1-29 (2005). I am excluding from this article discussion of economic
development organizations that seek 501(c)(3) status purely for educational (e.g. a
business incubator set up as part of a university’s MBA program) or scientific (e.g. to
fund research in a particular field) purposes as these organizations are not principally
pursuing charitable objectives.
74

75
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The word “charitable” is defined in the regulations
amplifying the Internal Revenue Code (the IRC Regulations)
both broadly by reference to the “generally-accepted legal
sense” of the word as well as by reference to a list of specific
purposes the word is understood to include.82 Most pertinent
from this list of specific purposes for economic development
organizations are “relief of the poor and distressed or of the
underprivileged”; “promotion of social welfare by organizations
designed . . . to lessen neighborhood tensions[,] . . . eliminate
prejudice and discrimination[,] . . . or . . . combat community
deterioration”; and “lessening of the burdens of Government.”83
Subject to a few exceptions, any organization that wishes to be
recognized as qualifying under Section 501(c)(3) must submit
an application to the IRS demonstrating that it is organized for
and its activities will exclusively further these types of
purposes and receive an IRS determination letter officially
recognizing its 501(c)(3) status.84
B.

The Private Benefit Doctrine

Nestled well within the IRC Regulations amplifying
Section 501(c)(3) is the “private benefit doctrine.” It is rooted in
language stating that an organization is not organized or
operated exclusively for exempt purposes under Section 501(c)(3)
“unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.”85
Although this phrase has generated considerable
confusion as to how and when the private benefit doctrine
applies,86 there is a near-consensus among commentators,
courts, and the IRS on several critical points. First, the private
benefit doctrine derives from the operational test of Section
501(c)(3); in other words, it clarifies that an organization
cannot be operated exclusively for exempt purposes, no matter
what it states as its purposes, unless its activities in fact
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) (2013).
Id.; see also Instructions for IRS Form 1023 (June 2006).
84 I.R.C. § 508(a) (2012) (requiring that organizations requesting recognition
under section 501(c)(3) submit an application, subject to certain exceptions). In
addition to demonstrating that it is organized for and its activities further charitable
purposes exclusively, the organization must also convince the IRS that it will avoid
certain activities that 501(c)(3) prohibits including (i) lobbying (beyond an
insubstantial amount), (ii) political campaigning, and (iii) allowing those who control
the organization from unduly profiting based on their positions of control (what the
statute characterizes as “private inurement”). I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
85 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii).
86 John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1064
(2006) (discussing the difficulty of defining the private benefit doctrine).
82

83
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primarily result in public benefit.87 Second, although the “rather
than” language in the regulation implies that the organization
cannot serve any private interest, the correct interpretation of
this phrase is that any benefit to private interests arising from
the organization’s activities must result only incidentally from
serving public interests.88 Finally, the private benefit doctrine
applies to all those who benefit from the organization’s activities
and not just to those who control the organization.89
So, conceptual issues aside, what does the private benefit
doctrine really mean? Read literally, it means that the activities
of a 501(c)(3) organization must principally benefit the public
and not private individuals or companies. Of course, the service
of public and private interests cannot be understood as mutually
exclusive concepts. The public is composed of individuals, so any
benefit to the public necessarily benefits private individuals.90
Those who are patients of charitable hospitals receive medical
care, those who attend the symphony hear music, and those who
go to a soup kitchen receive a free meal.
Rather, private benefit is thought of as benefit bestowed
upon individuals who are not part of the group of individuals who
are the intended beneficiaries of the organization’s charitable
purpose (the organization’s charitable class). Thus, the charitable
class for the hospital is its patients, for the symphony is its
listeners, and for the soup kitchen is those who are hungry and
without adequate means to provide food for themselves. In each
case, benefit bestowed upon members of the charitable class is
considered public benefit and, therefore, acceptable.91
The private benefits generated by the activities of a
charity are typically not limited to the members of its
charitable class, however. The hospital must pay its doctors
87 This point is clear given the language of the regulation from which the
private benefit doctrine arises (“An organization is not organized or operated exclusively
for one or more of the purposes specified in subdivision (i) of this subparagraph unless it
serves a public rather than a private interest.”). Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii); see
also HOPKINS, supra note 19, at § 20.11; Daryll K. Jones, Third-Party Profit-Taking in
Tax Exemption Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 977, 998 (2007).
88 See Jones, supra note 87, at 998-1002.
89 Accordingly, the private benefit doctrine is distinct from Section 501(c)(3)’s
express prohibition on taking the profits of the organization, which applies only to those
who are in control of it. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1069 (1989)
(determining that “nonincidental benefits conferred on disinterested persons may serve
private interests”); see also Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 47, 74 (1999).
90 Andrew Morgan et al., Private Benefit Under IRC 501(c)(3), in IRS EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2001,
135-36, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub (follow “irs-tege” hyperlink; then follow
“ectopich01.pdf” hyperlink); see also Colombo, supra note 86, at 1070.
91 Jones, supra note 87, at 979-80. HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 166-68.
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and nurses and purchase medical supplies from outside
vendors, the symphony must pay its musicians and rent a
music hall, and the soup kitchen may have to purchase food
and supplies from grocery stores. This is where the concept of
incidental private benefit comes into play. A charity is not
prohibited from benefitting private interests through its
activities so long as this benefit is incidental to the public
benefit the charity seeks to accomplish.92
The law relating to incidental private benefit, while
longstanding, has only been more fully articulated in the last
few decades through case law and IRS administrative
materials.93 It has essentially evolved into a two-part test: (1)
whether the private benefit in question is a necessary result of
the accomplishment of the intended public benefit (a qualitative
test), and (2) whether the private benefit is insubstantial
relative to the public benefit achieved (a quantitative test).94 To
use one of the examples described above: are the medical
supplies purchased by a charitable hospital necessary to
provide adequate medical care to the hospital’s patients, and is
the profit received by the supply vendors insubstantial relative
to the medical care received by the hospital’s patients? The
benefit must satisfy both the qualitative and quantitative tests
to be considered incidental.95
In theory, the IRS applies the private benefit doctrine in
every evaluation of a prospective 501(c)(3) organization;
however, there are a number of commonly occurring scenarios
92 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,589 (Dec. 8, 1986); I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
93 See Jones, supra note 87, at 998-1001 (contending that the private benefit
doctrine was “effectively ignored because it seemed only to state the obvious” until it
attracted case law and IRS attention in the late 1980s).
94 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). Describing a common
statement of this two-part test:

Any private benefit arising from a particular activity must be “incidental” in
both a qualitative and quantitative sense to the overall public benefit
achieved by the activity if the organization is to remain exempt. To be
qualitatively incidental, a private benefit must occur as a necessary
concomitant of the activity that benefits the public at large; in other words,
the benefit to the public cannot be achieved without necessarily benefiting
private individuals. Such benefits might also be characterized as indirect or
unintentional. To be quantitatively incidental, a benefit must be insubstantial
when viewed in relation to the public benefit conferred by the activity. It bears
emphasis that, even though exemption of the entire organization may be at
stake, the private benefit conferred by an activity or arrangement is balanced
only against the public benefit conferred by that activity or arrangement, not
the overall good accomplished by the organization.
95

Id.
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that implicate the doctrine most directly.96 The one most clearly
applicable to organizations aspiring to engage in charitable
economic development involves the instrumentality rule.
C.

The Instrumentality Rule

The instrumentality rule provides that there are certain
circumstances in which the IRS will recognize an organization
as charitable even though the immediate and primary
beneficiaries of its services are not members of a charitable
class so long as the ultimate effect of the activity benefits the
charitable class.97 In these instances, the private interests
benefitted are considered the “means” or “instruments” to the
accomplishment of a charitable end.98 The IRS must still be
convinced, however, that the benefit to private interests in this
context is necessary and insubstantial relative to the public
benefit the organization hopes will result.
One well-known example of this rule is when the IRS
recognized the exemption of an organization that intended to
make grants to legal interns (themselves not low-income or
otherwise distressed) so that the interns could provide free
legal services to residents of a depressed community.99 The
organization itself did not provide services to the residents,
instead relying on the interns to do so. The IRS recognized the
interns as “merely the instruments by which the charitable
purposes are accomplished.”100 The IRS has ruled similarly in
the case of an organization formed in a rural community
principally to raise funds and construct a medical building to
lure a doctor to a medically underserved community;101 and
likewise in the case of an organization that purchased
guaranteed student loans from banks to create a secondary
market for these loans and thus indirectly increase the
availability of financing to those seeking an education.102 The
96 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(iii), ex. 3 (2008) (when the activities
of an organization serve to create a market for one particular business or non-exempt
organization); Wendy L. Parker Rehab. Found. Inc. v. C.I.R., 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 51 (1986)
(when an organization directs its services at a group of individuals who, although
otherwise proper recipients of charitable services, are not numerous and undefined
enough to constitute a charitable class); Jones, supra, note 87, 1003-05 (when an
organization enters into a profit-sharing arrangement with a for-profit business).
97 HOPKINS, supra note 19, at § 6.3(b) (discussing IRS decisions regarding this rule).
98 Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 72-559, 1972-2 C.B. 247).
99 Rev. Rul. 72-559, 1972-2 C.B. 247.
100 Id.
101 Rev. Rul. 73-313, 1973-2 C.B. 174.
102 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,685 (Dec. 10, 1987).

2014]

TRICKLE DOWN CHARITY

1477

IRS viewed the doctor and the banks, respectively, as private
instrumentalities essential to cause a desired public benefit.
III.

THE 501(C)(3) JURISPRUDENCE OF CHARITABLE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Concepts like charitable purposes and the private
benefit doctrine, as set forth in Section 501(c)(3) and the IRC
Regulations that amplify it, are fairly abstract. These concepts
are more specifically applied to organizations engaged in
particular “types” of activities (e.g. housing, economic
development, and healthcare) in Revenue Rulings that express
the official position of the IRS on how the law applies to a
particular set of facts.103 Courts also apply these concepts
through case law when an organization challenges an IRS
decision.104 Thus, for each “type” of 501(c)(3) organization, a
unique jurisprudence develops based on relevant IRS Revenue
Rulings and case law. An examination of the 503(c)(3)
jurisprudence relating to charitable economic development
organizations follows below.
A.

“Aid to the Distressed” Rulings

The jurisprudence of precedential weight related to the
most common type of charities engaging in economic
development—those claiming to aid distressed people and
places—is contained almost entirely in three IRS Revenue
Rulings from the 1970s.105 In each of these rulings, the IRS
analyzed the activities of an organization seeking 501(c)(3) status
based on whether it “relieve[d] the poor and distressed,”
“combat[ed] community deterioration,” “eliminate[d] prejudice
and discrimination,” and/or “lessen[ed] neighborhood tensions.”106
These are the phrases from the IRC Regulations’ definition of
“charitable” that best reflect the philanthropic objectives of placebased economic development.107 They are also, not coincidentally,
the phrases economic development charities routinely include as
governing purposes in their charter documents.108 Accordingly,

103
104
105
106
107
108

See HOPKINS, supra note 19, app. A, at 974-76.
Id.
Infra text accompanying notes 110-27.
Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 163.
Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008).
See, e.g., Instructions to IRS Form 1023, Part VIII, Line 6a (2006).
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these three Rulings serve as the cornerstone for analyzing when
economic development is “charitable.”
The Rulings are brief and do not follow a consistent or
explicit analytic structure. To varying degrees, the IRS
considered the condition of the community that the organization
sought to serve, the particular businesses it aided, and the
benefit to the community that this aid would yield. Based on
this information, the IRS then provided its intuitive sense of
whether this meant that private business owners or the needy
would benefit more and ruled accordingly.
For example, in Revenue Ruling 74-587, the IRS
recognized an organization as a 501(c)(3) charity even though a
principal activity of the organization was making low-interest
or long-term loans to, and equity purchases in, privately owned
small businesses.109 At the outset, the IRS recognized that the
areas to which the organization would direct its services would
be high-density urban communities inhabited mainly by those
who were minorities or in other disadvantaged groups.110 The
IRS also recognized an unmet need of the businesses the
organization planned to aid and the negative impact this was
having in these communities. Due to a lack of access to capital,
among other conditions, “many of the businesses located in
these high-density urban areas have declined or fallen into
disrepair, and others have ceased to operate.”111 As a result, the
areas lacked employment opportunities for their residents.112
The IRS completed its analysis by drawing a connection
between the businesses the organization would aid and the
alleviation of local distress. The organization planned to
consult with other anti-poverty and anti-discrimination
programs in selecting recipients to coordinate its services with
articulated community needs and “offer the greatest potential
community benefit.”113 It would direct its aid to those
businesses that had not been able to obtain financing from
conventional sources and would give preference to businesses
that provided training and employment opportunities for the
unemployed and underemployed residents of the area.114 In
closing, the IRS cemented its decision to approve 501(c)(3)
status by invoking the instrumentality rule: “the recipients of
109
110
111
112
113
114

Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162-63.
Id.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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loans and working capital [who wouldn’t themselves qualify for
charitable assistance] are merely the instruments by which the
charitable purposes are sought to be accomplished.”115
In Revenue Ruling 76-419, the IRS came to the same
conclusion about an organization that purchased blighted land
in an economically depressed community, converted the land
into an industrial park, and leased it on favorable terms to
attract industrial businesses to move to the park.116 The
strength of the organization’s claim to charitable status
followed from the nexus between the businesses it aided and
the need for jobs among the community’s low-income
residents.117 To be eligible for the industrial park, businesses
had to agree in the leases “to hire a significant number of
presently unemployed persons in the area and to train them in
needed skills.”118 The industrial park would favor those businesses
with a need for low skill workers since this was of “greater
immediate benefit to the surrounding depressed community.”119
In contrast, in Revenue Ruling 77-111, the IRS denied
recognition of 501(c)(3) status to two similar organizations,
both endeavoring to increase the usage of retail businesses
located in communities suffering from economic decline.120 The
first organization planned to conduct what essentially
amounted to advertising and marketing activities to increase
patronage of local businesses.121 The second planned to
facilitate construction of a retail center (including a
department store and shopping mall) to stem the decline of
retail shopping in the community to outlying (presumably
suburban) areas.122 Here, the IRS concluded that “the overall
thrust [was] to promote business[,]” (that is, serve private
interests), “rather than to accomplish exclusively 501(c)(3)
objectives” (that is, serve public interests).123
But what distinguished these organizations from the
ones described in the previous two Rulings? The IRS did not go
Id.
Rev. Rule. 76-419, 1976-2 C.B. 146.
117 Id. The area had been recognized by the U.S. Economic Development
Administration as having “a high ratio of unemployed and underemployed low-income
people and is an area of urban blight consisting primarily of junk yards and vacant land
with little industry”. Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Rev. Rul. 77-111, 1977-1 C.B. 145.
121 Id. at 144 (providing information on the area’s shopping opportunities,
local transportation, and accommodations).
122 Id. at 144-45.
123 Id.
115
116
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into great detail on this point. Its principal contention was that
the services provided by the organizations in Revenue Ruling
77-111 would benefit all businesses located in the community
and in the retail center, respectively, without regard to whether
they were “owned by minority groups” or whether they were
experiencing difficulties based on their location in a deteriorated
section of the community.124 Remarkably, the Ruling makes no
mention of the extent to which the jobs and economic activity
associated with the aided businesses would alleviate distress in
the community served.125 The fact that the organization would
aid businesses regardless of whether the businesses themselves
were in some fashion distressed carried the day.126
These three Rulings provide a rudimentary template for
analyzing the type of economic development carried out by
REDOs. If an organization simply promotes business activity in
a community, it is not charitable even if the community is
distressed (Revenue Ruling 77-111); if it tailors its assistance
to businesses encountering some form of hardship or difficulty
resulting from the distressed community in which they are
located or seek to locate, it may be charitable depending on the
circumstances (Revenue Rulings 74-587 and 76-419). No
subsequent Rulings have modified these decisions, and there is
no case law on the issue.
Elucidating “precedential” jurisprudence on tax law
matters is publicly available non-precedential guidance that the
IRS provides in the form of (1) private letter rulings (PLRs)
addressed to individual people and entities that request IRS
guidance on a specific issue, and (2) internal IRS office memoranda
(technical advice memoranda and general counsel memoranda) on
issues that the IRS determines merit the consideration of its inhouse attorneys.127 Although the Internal Revenue Code expressly
prohibits reliance by the public on these non-precedential
materials,128 they are useful in understanding the IRS’s position on
a particular issue, and typically contain more detail and are in
much greater supply than Revenue Rulings.129
The IRS has released numerous PLRs over the last three
decades evaluating the 501(c)(3) eligibility of charitable economic
development organizations and they all cite to some combination
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 145.
Id.
Id.
See HOPKINS, supra note 19, app. A, at 978.
I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3).
See HOPKINS, supra note 19, app. A, at 978.
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of the three 1970s era Rulings.130 Only once, in the early 1990s in
an intra-agency memorandum, did the IRS elaborate on its
position. In response to a request for a private letter ruling from a
business incubator offering technical, managerial, and financial
assistance to businesses in a “depressed” community in America’s
Rust Belt and some intra-agency disagreement as to how to
evaluate it, the IRS prepared a General Counsel Memorandum
synthesizing the 1970s era Rulings.131
The Memorandum is noteworthy for several reasons.
First, the IRS explicitly identified the private benefit doctrine
as the crucial issue in evaluating whether economic
development is charitable.132 Second, the IRS specifically
distinguished (and disapproved of) a more liberal, trickle down
approach to “charitable” economic development that would
recognize an organization assisting any business in a depressed
area as charitable (on the theory that increased employment
increases tax revenues and a general increase in business
activity is itself inherently beneficial to the area). Instead, the
IRS seemed insistent on a stricter nexus requirement that
requires the assistance provided to link to particular problems
experienced by those residing or trying to operate a business
within the depressed area.133 In rejecting the former and
embracing the latter, the IRS made clear its concern that not
limiting “charitable” assistance to those businesses achieving
the greatest potential community benefit would “encourage
private business development while only incidentally
furthering social welfare purposes.”134 Finally, in consolidating
the 1970s era Rulings into an explicit three-factor test, the
Memorandum added some detail and depth to the original
analysis, including that a charitable incubator must offer its
services on non-commercial terms, impose significant limitations
on which geographic areas and businesses are aided and direct
its services toward those recipients that will offer the greatest
potential community benefit to the depressed area.135
While this expanded analysis provided a somewhat
clearer and fuller template for analyzing economic development
organizations, it appears that the IRS soon after cast it aside.
130 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-35-032 (Sept. 2, 2011); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 2006-14-030 (Apr. 7, 2006); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2004-47-048 (Nov. 19, 2004);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-03-083 (Jan. 19, 2001).
131 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,883 (Oct. 26, 1992).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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It was never incorporated into precedential law, nor has the IRS
ever referred to it again, except in the private letter ruling that
was the impetus for the memorandum.136 Instead, subsequent
IRS letter rulings only reference and reflect the more intuitive
and less structured approach of the 1970s era Rulings.137
B.

“Lessening the Burdens of Government” Rulings

Organizations
that
“lessen[ ] . . . the
burdens
of
government” form a second category of economic development
organizations that qualify as charities.138 This phrase also appears
in the definition of “charitable” contained in the IRC Regulations.139
Although reducing the work of the government may not
comport with the common perception of charity, it is wellestablished under Section 501(c)(3) as a separate, independent
basis for exemption.140 This basis for exemption is rooted in the
theory that work that lessens a governmental burden saves
public money, which promotes the general welfare.141 The U.S.
tax system does not impose income tax on state or local
government branches or government instrumentalities, and
donations to these public entities for public purposes are
generally tax-deductible.142 Therefore, providing 501(c)(3) status
for organizations that do the work of government seems equitable.
At first glance, this phrase appears to open the
floodgates for many more economic development organizations
to qualify under Section 501(c)(3). Economic development is a
common activity for state and local governments regardless of
the condition of the areas or constituents that they serve.143 A
broad interpretation of “lessening the burdens of government”
could encapsulate any organization whose mission overlaps
with any government function. At least conceptually, however,
two significant limitations apply.
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-40-001 (May 1, 1992).
See rulings cited supra note 130.
138 See Instructions to IRS Form 1023, Part VIII, Line 6a (identifying which
phrases included in the definition of charitable apply to economic development).
139 Treas. Reg. 1.501 (c)(3) -1 (d)(2) (2008).
140 See Internal Revenue Service, Instrumentalities—Lessening the Burdens of
Government, 1984 EO CPE Text (1984).
141 H.R. Rep. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1939) (Congressional report explaining the
government’s relief from financial burden as one basis for exempting charitable
organizations from taxation).
142 No provision in the Internal Revenue Code imposes the federal income tax on
government entities. See I.R.C. § 170 (c)(1) (allowing for deductibility of charitable
contributions to political subdivisions of the United States and its states and possessions).
143 See Luger, supra note 9.
136
137
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First, the IRS has ruled that, to lessen governmental
burdens, an organization must demonstrate that (1) a
governmental unit considers the organization’s activities to be
the government’s burden, and (2) the organization’s activities
actually lessen the burden of government.144 In evaluating
whether an organization meets this two-part test, the IRS
considers multiple factors, most of which center around whether
the activities the organization plans to engage in are those the
government actually performed or planned to perform, and the
degree of control the government will exercise over the
organization’s performance of those activities.145 In short, the
more control a governmental unit exerts over an organization
(for example, through seats on its board of directors, funding
agreements, and annual reporting requirements) and the
stronger the evidence that the organization’s specific activities
replace activities that the governmental unit would otherwise
have to perform (rather than activities it simply endorses or
supports), the more likely the organization will be seen to be
lessening the government’s burdens.146
Tax law of precedential weight is virtually non-existent
on the question of when place-based economic development
actually lessens the burdens of government. A review of nonprecedential IRS letter rulings and memos, however, indicates
that once an economic development organization has met the
two-part test described in the previous paragraph, a very broad
range of activities qualify as charitable. Examples include:
using public bond proceeds to acquire and develop property
that will be sold or leased to for-profit corporations to aid in
their creation and expansion,147 forming an innovation
incubation center for commercial tenants to lure high
technology companies to a state,148 acquiring and leasing an
office building to attract international trade business,149 and
even owning a Major League baseball team to keep it from
leaving town.150 Although most of these cases involved
Rev. Rul. 85-2, 1985-1 C.B. 178 (1985).
Robert Louthian & Amy Henchey, Lessening the Burdens of Government,
1993 EO CPE Text (1993) (listing some of the factors as interrelationship with
governmental unit, activity previously conducted by governmental unit, payment of
government expenses, sources of funding, and whether activity is one that could be
performed directly by governmental unit).
146 Id.
147 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,852 (June 19, 1991).
148 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-37-038 (Sept. 16, 2005).
149 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-46-032 (Nov. 13, 1992).
150 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
144

145
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organizations serving economically distressed areas, none of
the rulings were predicated solely on this finding.151
A second conceptual limitation is the private benefit
doctrine. The IRC Regulation that applies the private benefit
doctrine to all 501(c)(3) organizations makes no distinction for
charities that lessen governmental burdens.152 The very limited
case law on point backs up the applicability of the doctrine to
these organizations.153 In the most relevant case, a U.S. Tax
Court noted that an organization that claimed to lessen
governmental burdens by conducting a certification program
for structural steel fabricators also lessened the burden of
business owners and developers in an equivalent amount, and
the organization had not demonstrated that this benefit was
incidental to the public benefit achieved.154 Thus, the private
benefit doctrine trumped the organization’s claim that it
lessened the burdens of government.
One relatively early IRS general counsel memorandum
took a similar approach in evaluating an economic development
organization. Although finding on other grounds that the
organization did not meet the test of lessening governmental
burdens, the IRS noted that, even if it had, the organization
would have had to have been evaluated on whether it “serve[d]
public, rather than private, purposes.”155 In passing, the IRS
noted that the organization’s proposed construction of office space
and facilities to lure businesses to the city that it promoted left
considerable doubt that it primarily served public interests even
where the goal was to increase local employment.156
This memorandum stands in contrast to the approach the
IRS usually takes (especially more recently), which is to almost
entirely ignore the private benefit doctrine when charities
engage in economic development under the guise of
governmental function. In one private letter ruling, the IRS
conceded that below-market rates would be given by a 501(c)(3)
organization to start-up business tenants but spent virtually no
time measuring the public benefit that would result or the
151 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-37-038 (Sept. 16, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
95-30-024 (July 28, 1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-46-032 (Nov. 13, 1992); I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 39,852 (June 19, 1991).
152 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
153 Policemen’s Benev. Ass’n of Richmond, Va. v. United States, 661 F. Supp.
765, 767, 772 (E.D.Va. 1987); Indiana Crop Improvement Ass’n, Inc. v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.
394, 399-400 (1981); At Cost Servs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 573, 576 (2000).
154 Quality Auditing Co., Inc. v. C.I.R., 114 T.C. 498 (June 19, 2000).
155 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,693, 1981 WL 169531 (Apr. 15, 1981).
156 Id.
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segment of the public that would benefit; it stated simply that
the project is “expected to provide significant employment in an
underutilized area.”157 In another ruling, addressing a
community foundation’s purchase of the Kansas City Royals, the
IRS noted that “the [f]oundation’s investment would flow
through to private parties involved in the [t]eam’s operation”
(including the players—most of whom received multi-million
dollar salaries), but simply dismissed these benefits as
“qualitatively and quantitatively incidental to the charitable
purpose of lessening the burdens of government” without any
further analysis.158 In short, the most relevant on-point IRS
rulings barely mention the private benefit doctrine or do not
consider it at all.159
C.

Additional Regulatory Standards Pertaining to
Charitable Economic Development

Although not technically applicable to most 501(c)(3)
organizations, another source of standards pertinent to
understanding what constitutes charitable economic development
can be found in the IRC Regulations that govern program-related
investment by 501(c)(3) private foundations (PRI Regulations).160
The PRI Regulations reflect the IRS position on when investments
by foundations in for-profit companies and other non-exempt
entities for economic development purposes are charitable and are
of greater authoritative weight than Revenue Rulings. Ultimately,
however, the PRI Regulations in this area simply confirm the
continued relevance of the 1970s-era Revenue Rulings, as the fact
patterns contained in these regulations largely mirror the analysis
and conclusions contained in those Rulings.161

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-37-038 (Sept. 16, 2005).
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-024 (July 28, 1995).
159 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-37-038 (Sept. 16, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
95-30-024 (July 28, 1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-46-032 (Nov. 13, 1992); I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 39,852 (June 19, 1991).
160 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3 (2013).
161 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) (2013). Very recently, the IRS, in conjunction with
the U.S. Treasury Department, released proposed additions to the list of examples in the
PRI Regulations. The new examples, promulgated largely to reflect that PRIs are made not
just in furtherance of place-based economic development but also extend to other charitable
purposes like the development of disease-fighting drugs, preservation of the environment
and promotion of the arts, do not add much to understanding the specific circumstances in
which the IRS views economic development as achieving charitable purposes. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 53.4944-3(b), 77 Fed. Reg. 23429, 23430-32 (Apr. 19, 2012).
157
158
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SHORTCOMINGS OF THE STATUS QUO

The current jurisprudence relating to charitable
economic development, as summarized in Part III, and the
IRS’s current oversight of organizations involved in this type of
work are inadequate for effectively regulating a newer breed of
economic development charities exemplified by REDOs.
Charitable economic development in any form presents a
regulatory challenge for the IRS because the direct recipients of
aid are for-profit enterprises. For-profit companies seek
primarily to create wealth for their owners who are usually not
members of a charitable class. Accordingly, public benefit
occurs only as an indirect result of the success of the
intermediary for-profit enterprises which are organized and
obligated to prioritize the private benefit of their owners over
the achievement of any public good.
Moreover, in contrast to other charitable “instrumentality”
cases (for example, the legal interns that received grants from a
charity to represent low income individuals), the accomplishment
of a charitable end as a result of this type of an intermediary’s
acts is less immediate and even uncertain. A loan to a start-up
business may allow it to purchase equipment or rent office
space or pay for technical expertise vital to its reaching the
next stage of development. But the payoff to a distressed
community as a result of the loan in terms of new jobs,
additional tax revenue, or other measurable impact may be
years away or may never come at all.162 Aid to the community
trickles down slowly if at all; the only certain beneficiaries are
the for-profit companies.163
These problems are only heightened as charitable
economic development is increasingly carried out by organizations
with a broader regional focus. As REDOs aid businesses in areas
that are geographically larger and socioeconomically more
diverse, determining whether, when, and how those who are
worthy targets of charitable aid actually benefit becomes all the
more difficult. Standing as it does in sharp contrast to more
conventional charitable activity (which is typically provided
directly and immediately to members of a charitable class),
“charitable” economic development would seem to merit careful

162 See generally Bartik, supra note 9; see also Norman Krumholz, Equitable
Approaches to Local Economic Development, 27 POL’Y STUDIES J. 83 (1999).
163 Krumholz, supra note 162 at 85.
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additional attention from the IRS. But this is not reflected in the
current jurisprudence or IRS practices.164
This article proposes that the problem with the current
system has three components—(1) the current jurisprudential
analytic standards for evaluating whether an economic
development organization is charitable are too outdated and
blunt to adequately assess contemporary organizations, (2)
there is inconsistency in how rigorously even these inadequate
standards are applied, and (3) the IRS has no adequate
mechanism for monitoring whether an economic development
organization accomplishes charitable ends after it is initially
recognized as a 501(c)(3) charity. As a result, there is
significant potential for organizations to benefit from the
substantial tax breaks, access to funding, and societal goodwill
associated with 501(c)(3) status, even though the ends
accomplished by their work are not really charitable. I discuss
the basis for these three concerns and the resulting harm in
greater detail here in Part IV before moving on to possible
solutions, further considerations, and recommendations in the
sections that follow. My principal contention is that a more
nuanced, consistent, and frequent application of the private
benefit doctrine to all organizations engaged in charitable
economic development can address all three concerns.
A.

Outdated and Blunt Analytic Standards

The principal task of the IRS in applying the private benefit
test to charitable economic development is to decipher whether, in
a particular set of circumstances, the aid to businesses that an
organization provides results primarily in the accomplishment of
charitable or commercial objectives. Put into private benefit
terminology, is the benefit resulting from the assistance rendered
to the for-profit instrumentalities in fact both insubstantial relative
to the benefit ultimately experienced by a charitable class, and
necessary for achievement of that public benefit?165 Or is it the
other way around—is the charitable class merely the incidental
beneficiary of the services rendered to the instrumentalities?
These questions are easier to ask than to answer. There
is no fixed percentage for what constitutes insubstantiality; no
uniform mechanism for quantifying benefits (some of which are
monetary and some of which are not); “necessity” can be largely
164
165

See generally supra Part III.
See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
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subjective; and even the question of when some benefits should
be considered public and when they are private is debatable.
The precedential jurisprudence arising from the 1970s-era
Revenue Rulings fills the gaps only to an extent (and only as to
the more common form of place-based charitable economic
development organizations—those purporting to aid the poor and
distressed). As explained in Part III, these Rulings consider, to
varying degrees: (1) whether the area the charity serves is
distressed, (2) the needs of the businesses it serves, and (3) the
nexus between the benefits aid to those businesses will yield and
the alleviation of the area’s distress.166 Within this loose
framework, the IRS develops its hunch on whether the
organization primarily serves commercial or charitable purposes.
This framework worked well enough in assessing the
more obviously charitable forms of economic development
conducted in the 1970s by CDCs in highly distressed
neighborhoods.167 But it is too imprecise for the economic
development of the twenty-first century, like that conducted by
REDOs. To demonstrate this, consider the example of the
Business Accelerator, profiled in Part I. The organization’s
ultimate objective is revitalization of an economically depressed
region. It seeks to accomplish this by investing seed capital in
and providing technical assistance to the region’s companies
with the highest potential. Aside from realizing a return on its
investment to satisfy stockholders, the Business Accelerator
operates like a private sector venture capital firm.168
The first consideration from the Rulings is whether the
area the organization serves is “distressed.” But what
constitutes “distress”? There is no established definition for
501(c)(3) purposes. Furthermore, how much of an area must be
distressed in order to qualify it as an appropriate target of
charitable economic development? The economically depressed
anchor city served by the Business Accelerator will likely
satisfy most definitions of distressed. But what about the
surrounding 15-county region? The nature of urban sprawl in
present day America is that proximate to most distressed
Supra Part III.
See supra Part I (discussing the history of charitable economic
development and community development corporations in subsections (a)-(c)).
168 Venture capital firms invest in early-stage companies with high growth
potential but sufficient risk that banks are not yet willing to invest. A venture capitalist
typically takes a seat on the board of directors and plays a management role in companies
in which it invests. See, e.g., VC Industry Overview, NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N,
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141&Itemid=589
(last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
166

167
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urban cores is a mix of enclaves of significant wealth, and areas
that are largely upper middle and/or middle-class.169
The broad geographic and socioeconomic coverage of
REDOs begs the question of how much of the organization’s
services must go toward companies in the region’s highly
distressed areas. REDOs like the Business Accelerator often
make their investments in businesses and individuals located
in the more affluent sections of the regions they serve.170 As a
practical matter, this makes sense given that those with the
means and educational background to cultivate high-growth
businesses are more likely to be found in areas of affluence
than in those that are poverty-stricken.171 But is location
proximate to an area of severe distress enough to make a
business an appropriate target for charitable aid and, if so, how
close must it be? What is the appropriate mix of wealth and
poverty within a large region in order for businesses throughout
it to be considered appropriate targets of charitable aid? The
current jurisprudence, which is based on IRS rulings analyzing
organizations serving highly impoverished urban neighborhoods,
does not consider areas with mixed demographics.
The second jurisprudential consideration is also difficult to
evaluate. Is it “necessary” that the Business Accelerator provide
the companies it serves with financing and technical services in
the sense that the companies would not otherwise have access to
them? With an eye toward regional transformation, organizations
like the Business Accelerator often target new economy
companies with perceived high-growth potential, like
biotechnology, software, engineering, and medical research
enterprises pursuing cutting-edge technologies.172 Undoubtedly,
these enterprises are much better situated to attract private
sector financing than the minority-owned businesses described in
169 See VEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 20-26 (describing how broad economic
trends, locational preferences of individuals, and state policies have facilitated the
migration of people, jobs, and resources toward expanding metropolitan fringes, while
reinforcing the concentration of poverty and deterioration of urban cores).
170 See,
e.g., JUMPSTART, http://www.jumpstartinc.org/aboutus/pressroom/
pressreleases.aspx, (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (review of JumpStart’s press releases
from July 2011 to June 2012 shows it made 11 investments of $250,000 apiece—2 of
the companies invested in were located in Cleveland and Akron which have high
poverty rates while remaining 9 companies were located in suburban areas).
171 Edward L. Glaeser et al., Consumer City, 1 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 27 (2001)
(finding that high human capital workers are attracted to areas with amenities and
high quality of life).
172 See, e.g., websites of REDOs identified supra note 11 for portfolios of
companies they assist; see also e.g., IDEA FOUNDRY, http://ideafoundry.org/portfolio (last
visited Mar. 4, 2014); HOUSTON TECH. CENTER, http://www.houstontech.org/abouthouston-technology-center/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
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Revenue Ruling 74-587 that were located in highly distressed
neighborhoods and red-lined by local banks.
The third consideration raises even thornier questions:
What is the nexus between the assistance the Business
Accelerator provides to its business clients and addressing the
needs of those in the community who are distressed? The 1970sera Revenue Rulings distinguished between organizations
supporting business activity in any form from those that
targeted businesses that promised to hire low income or low
skilled workers, or targeted entrepreneurs who were themselves
low income or otherwise distressed.173 Again, the businesses
targeted by organizations like the Business Accelerator are often
more sophisticated and seeking to commercialize a technology or
scientific discovery.174 Their founders and leadership teams
consist of highly educated, highly skilled individuals whose
prospects for employment elsewhere are almost certainly quite
good. The short-term hiring needs of companies in these
industries typically involve other highly educated, highly skilled
individuals like researchers, engineers, programmers, and those
with CEO/CFO experience.175 Provided one of these companies
ultimately proves successful and becomes fully operational, its
hiring needs may change to include manufacturing, office staff,
and sales positions, but the number of jobs like this that might
be created can be quite speculative and even the success of
these businesses is difficult to predict. Moreover, early-stage,
knowledge-based companies are susceptible to being lured to
other regions when subsequent funding, a buyer, or new
leadership emerges elsewhere.176 Is there really a close link
between the types of companies that an organization like the
Business Accelerator invests in and the needs of an economically
distressed region’s unemployed and poor residents?
Given these difficulties, how does the IRS evaluate
twenty-first-century economic development? Put simply, the
IRS tells its agents who review applications for recognition of

See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-111.
See, e.g., supra note 170.
175 See, e.g., JUMPSTART JOB BOARD, http://jumpstartincc.force.com/careers
(displaying current open positions at Jumpstart portfolio companies) (last visited
Apr. 23, 2013).
176 Chuck Soder, Startups with Ties to Other Areas May Not Grow in Ohio,
CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (May 21, 2012), http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/
20120521/SUB1/305219980/1053/toc&Profile=1053.
173

174
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501(c)(3) status to use their intuition.177 The agents are
instructed to follow a “facts and circumstances” approach and
exercise their judgment in determining whether “the ultimate
good received by the general public outweighs the private
benefit accorded to the direct beneficiaries.”178 But the IRS
provides no clear markers or methodology. This has historically
been the policy of the IRS when it comes to most organizations
that raise private benefit issues.179 This approach has come
under sharp criticism from commentators and scholars, who
have characterized the IRS’s application of the private benefit
doctrine as “pliant,”180 inconsistent and inefficient,181 and
subject to the agency’s enforcement policy whims.182
The end result is that charities engaged in economic
development do not appear to receive careful or consistent
consideration under the private benefit doctrine, which is the
very issue on which their 501(c)(3) status ought to turn.
REDOs that invest publicly subsidized money directly into high
growth potential businesses across broad and demographically
diverse geographic areas are proliferating.183 Yet how are they
surviving IRS review under the 1970s era Revenue Rulings if,
as the discussion above of the Business Accelerator reveals,
these organizations are aiding businesses that aren’t
necessarily distressed, in areas of the country that aren’t
necessarily poor and are creating jobs that don’t necessarily go
to the unemployed? A review of two IRS Private Letter Rulings
from the past decade reveals how the current approach to
evaluating economic development can lead to significantly
divergent outcomes. In one case, the IRS found that an
organization that offered start-up businesses below market
rates at its incubator and innovation center was achieving
charitable purposes simply because it was “stimulating the
economy” across an entire state by aiding the growth of hightechnology businesses and did so without even a mention of the
private benefit doctrine.184 In another case, the IRS rejected the
177 See Robert Louthian & Marvin Friedlander, Economic Development
Corporations: Charity Through the Back Door (1992 EO CPE Text),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicg92.pdf.
178 Id.
179 Megosh et al., Private Benefit Under IRC 501(c)(3) (2001 EO CPE Text),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich01.pdf.
180 HOPKINS, supra note19, at 20.11(b).
181 Jones, supra note 87, at 1005-06.
182 Colombo, supra note 86, at 1079.
183 See supra notes 11, 15.
184 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200537038 (Sept. 16, 2005).
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claim for charitable status of an organization assisting
merchants to promote their businesses in an area of a
community designated by the government as “distressed”
because “that assistance is not limited to businesses
experiencing difficulty” and includes some businesses that are
“making money and are viable” and based its conclusion
squarely on the private benefit doctrine.185
It is difficult to extrapolate a consistent principle from
the current landscape. Based on the facts in recent IRS Private
Letter Rulings, one might conclude that the IRS prefers
organizations that provide businesses with capital infusions
and incubator space over those that offer advertising and
marketing assistance, and prefers aid to start-up and
technology companies over aid to merchants.186 But these
distinctions seem arbitrary if the purpose of the private benefit
doctrine in this context is to clarify those scenarios in which aid
to private businesses primarily benefits the businesses and
their owners and those in which this aid primarily benefits the
community the organization aspires to serve. What does seem
clear is the need for more meaningful, consistent, and up-todate standards applying the private benefit doctrine to
charitable economic development.
B.

Inconsistent Application of Analytic Standards

In addressing the shortcomings of the current standards
above, I singled out IRS treatment of economic development
organizations that base their claim to charitable status on
providing aid to the distressed. As Part III explained, another
category of 501(c)(3) economic development organizations rely
also or, in some cases, exclusively on the claim that they are
“lessening the burdens of government.”187 In theory, a 501(c)(3)
organization must satisfy the private benefit doctrine irrespective
of which phrase it relies upon. In reality, however, the IRS applies
the private benefit doctrine even less carefully and consistently to
organizations that “lessen governmental burdens” than it does to
organizations “seeking to aid the distressed.”
Recall the example of the Regional Advocate, another one
of the modern day REDOs profiled in Part I. This organization’s
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200447048 (Nov. 19, 2004).
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201135032 (Sept. 2, 2011); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200537038 (Sept. 16, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006 14030 (Apr. 7, 2006); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 200447048 (Nov. 19, 2004).
187 Supra Part III.B.
185

186
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primary objective is the creation of high-quality, high-wage jobs
in an already up-and-coming region. Its activities consist of
assembling relocation packages to get companies to move to the
region, pursuing marketing initiatives touting the region and its
businesses, and spearheading legislative agendas to create an
environment that is even more business friendly. The Regional
Advocate has elected public officials on its board of directors,
gets one half of its funding from public sources, and engages in
the types of marketing and business-attraction activities that
state and local governments around the country are increasingly
undertaking. Thus, it can legitimately claim that it lessens
governmental burdens.
But how does an organization like this satisfy the private
benefit doctrine? The geographic area it serves is prosperous.
Every aspect of its programming involves providing direct support
to individual businesses and/or the business community in
general, but without any mention of distress or need encountered
by those businesses. Moreover, its programs are focused more on
attracting businesses from elsewhere than creating new
businesses from within. An organization like the Regional
Advocate would likely assert that it serves public interests by
relieving municipal governments in the region of the costs
associated with engaging in their own individual economic
initiatives and aiding its growing population by making high
wage jobs available. But how do these “public” benefits measure
up against the substantial amount of financial, marketing, and
legislative assistance that the organization provides to already
functional businesses? What about the countervailing interests of
other regions (quite possibly distressed regions in other parts of
the country or world) whose companies and jobs are being lured
away by the organization? Did the crafters of the Tax Code really
intend to incentivize job poaching through the charitable subsidy?
As explained in Part III, the answer is that the IRS
typically expends very little, if any, effort applying the private
benefit doctrine to organizations like the Regional Advocate. A
review of IRS private letter rulings and General Counsel
memoranda evaluating economic development organizations
that claim to lessen governmental burdens backs up this
contention.188 Moreover, the IRS has explicitly chided itself for
188 See generally I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200537038 (Sept. 16, 2005); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 9530024, 1995 WL 45044 (July 28, 1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9246032 (Nov.
13, 1992); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,852 (July 1, 1991); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
38,693 (Apr. 15, 1981).
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not scrutinizing private benefit implications closely enough
when organizations claim to lessen the burdens of government.
Training materials for its own agents state that
often neglected in lessening the burdens cases is a consideration of
the private interests served by the organization’s activities;
irrespective of whether an organization’s activities lessen the
burdens of government, the organization must still demonstrate that
its activities serve a public rather than a private interest within the
meaning of Reg 1.501(c)(3)–(d)(1).189

Published IRS rulings subsequent to this self-reprimand
give no indication that IRS agents have followed this
directive.190 It is hard to blame the agents, however. If the
private benefit standards that apply to economic development
organizations that “aid the distressed” can be described as
rudimentary, those that apply to organizations that “lessen the
burdens of government” are virtually nonexistent. There is no
equivalent in these cases to the 1970s-era Revenue Rulings.
When the private benefit doctrine is mentioned at all in lessening
the burdens of government cases, the letter rulings make only
vague references to ensuring that public benefit predominates
over private benefit with little hint of how to measure one relative
to the other. In its training materials, the IRS does no more than
direct its agents to cases in which other agents engaged in an
intuitive balancing of public and private benefit.191 The IRS lacks
a consistent (or perhaps any) approach for evaluating REDOs
that claim to lessen governmental burdens on an issue that
should be critical to their 501(c)(3) eligibility.
C.

Inadequate Mechanisms for Ensuring Ongoing
Compliance

IRS scrutiny of 501(c)(3) organizations is heavily frontloaded. Most organizations that seek 501(c)(3) status must
submit an application on Form 1023 to the IRS which will be
reviewed by one of the agency’s exempt organizations
189 Louthian & Henchey, supra note 145, 1993 EO CPE Text (1993),
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb93.pdf.
190 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200537038 (Sept. 16, 2005) (reasoning that a
foundation serves public interest because of its charitable purposes, with minimal
discussion of the private benefit doctrine); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9530024 (July 28, 1995)
(concluding private benefit is incidental to the purpose of lessening the burden of
government although it overlooked the pertinent principles of the private benefit doctrine).
191 Louthian
& Henchey, supra note 145, at 1993 EO CPE Text,
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb93.pdf; Andrew Mergosh, Lary Scollick, Mary Jo
Salins and Chevy Chasin, Private Benefit Under 501(c)(3), 2001 EO CPE Text (2001).
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specialists to determine if the organization will operate within
the limits of Section 501(c)(3).192 One of the questions on the
application is specifically directed at organizations that will
engage in economic development and asks the applicant to
explain who will benefit from these types of activities and how
they will further charitable purposes.193 However, organizations
typically apply for 501(c)(3) status before they begin to operate
or at a nascent stage and, therefore, their responses related to
program services are often prospective.194 As a result, to the
extent the IRS questions a REDO on how it will satisfy private
benefit concerns, the organization’s responses are based on
what it thinks its activities will be and what it hopes these
activities will accomplish.
If the IRS issues a determination letter to the
organization recognizing its exempt status, the organization
can rely on this indefinitely.195 There is no formal mechanism
by which the organization must periodically reestablish the
basis for its exempt status. Thus, most organizations are
granted tax-exempt status on the basis of largely aspirational
and non-specific projections about their programming and
never again separately questioned about it.
It is true that most 501(c)(3) organizations must also
submit annual information returns to the IRS. The return
contains financial and factual information related to the
operations of the organization.196 This document is used by
government officials, prospective contributors, the media, and
others to evaluate the overall finances, operations, and merits
of an exempt organization.197 However, although the IRS may
use information contained in an organization’s Form 990 as the
basis for investigating the organization, Form 990 is
principally a public disclosure document. Due to limited
staffing, the IRS Tax Exempt Division typically reviews less
than two percent of the 990s it receives198 and audits returns at
a rate of one-third of one percent.199
I.R.C. § 508(a) (2006).
I.R.S. Form 1023, Part VIII, questions 6a and 6b.
194 See I.R.S. Publication 557 (2013). Because most organizations must receive
a determination letter before they can take advantage of the tax and funding benefits
associated with 501(c)(3) status, organizations typically apply soon after incorporating.
195 See HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 806-07.
196 I.R.S. Form 990 (2013).
197 HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 810.
198 See Fishman, supra note 20, at 581.
199 Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11
FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2011).
192

193
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Moreover, although the Form 990 requests detailed
information on certain aspects of an organization’s operations
that are particularly likely to raise hot button legal compliance
issues—such as executive compensation, transactions with
organizational insiders, and lobbying activities—the Form
requires little detail on the foundational issues of how an
organization conducts its programs and who specifically it
serves.200 The Form asks only one direct question about an
organization’s program services during the previous year.201 In
answering this question, organizations are directed by the IRS
Form 990 instructions to briefly describe the programs and
provide specific measurements of its accomplishments, like the
number of “clients served” and “sessions or events held.”202 But
no more is required in terms of factual details. In fact, most
organizations are fairly strategic in how they respond to this
question, recognizing that their Form 990 is open to public
inspection.203 Many respond simply with a sentence or two
description of each program service.204 From a 501(c)(3)
engaged in economic development, the Form requires no
information regarding the specific companies served by this
type of organization, how the assistance the organization
provided aided those in the region served who needed
assistance, and/or how the assistance received by the
businesses served was incidental to (that is, insubstantial
relative to and necessary for) the achievement of public benefit.
The end result is that the IRS’s only significant
investigation of the link between who benefits from an
organization’s activities and its proclaimed exempt purposes is
usually completed when the organization initially files an
application for 501(c)(3) status. For the many 501(c)(3)
organizations engaged in conventional charitable activities that
involve the direct and immediate provision of aid to members of
an obvious charitable class, this method of regulation is not
problematic and is sensitive to IRS resource limitations. But it is
not effective for monitoring economic development organizations.
It is easy for organizations to project the anticipated
public benefit that will result from investments in private
I.R.S. Form 990, Part VII (2013).
I.R.S. Form 990, Part III, question 4.
202 I.R.S., Instructions for Form 990 Return of Org. Exempt from Income Tax
(Dec. 2, 2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf.
203 I.R.S. Form 990 (in top right corner, the form states “Open to Public Inspection”).
204 See, e.g., GREATER PHOENIX ECON. COUNCIL (I.R.S. Form 990 at 2) (2010)
(answering question 4 with only two sentences).
200

201
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businesses, but much harder to ensure that these projections
come to fruition. Public sector programs that aid private
businesses often demand accountability for the tax breaks and
publicly financed loans they provide, sometimes even requiring
that businesses return a portion of the aid they receive if
results don’t meet the initial projections.205 The IRS, on the
other hand, has no mechanism for evaluating whether
charitable economic development organizations come close to
appropriately balancing the achievement of public and private
benefit once they become operational. In other words, there is
no long-term accountability with respect to the very issue that
makes economic development organizations a regulatory
challenge and worthy of special attention.
D.

The Harm in the Status Quo

My critique up until this point has focused on arguing
how the IRS’s current approach fails to adequately evaluate
which nonprofit organizations engaged in economic development
satisfy private benefit concerns and, thus, are really charitable.
It is fair at this point to ask the question, “So what?” After all,
the other 28 subchapters of Section 501(c) allow a broad range of
nonprofit organizations other than charities to qualify for
exemption from income tax.206 Almost all REDOs could achieve
tax exemption under Section 501(c)(4) as organizations that
operate “for the promotion of social welfare” by satisfying far less
exacting standards than apply under Section 501(c)(3).207 Thus,
what is the real harm associated with the IRS’s current lack of
precision and rigor in scrutinizing those seeking to be economic
development charities?
While multifaceted, the “harm” is linked to the
consequences of an IRS determination that an organization
qualifies as a 501(c)(3), as opposed to another type of tax-exempt
entity. The law at all levels uniquely privileges nonprofit
organizations engaged in charitable work.208 While commentators
205 Steve Lerch, Economic Development Accountability Laws, WASH. ST. INST.
PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2004) (summarizing different types of economic development
accountability legislation city and state governments have passed to ensure that
incentives provided to businesses meet desired economic development goals).
206 I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012).
207 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012).
208 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW
OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 155-58 (2005) (describing tax and non-tax benefits at federal, state,
and local levels associated with 501(c)(3) status).
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have offered multiple theories for why that is, an overlapping
theme is that charities undertake tasks widely accepted as
meritorious and beneficial to society, but which the private
sector and/or the government are unable or unwilling to
perform.209 Accordingly, our society at large chooses to subsidize
and incentive the performance of charitable work through laws
that provide tax incentives, regulatory exemptions, and myriad
other privileges unique to 501(c)(3)s that, when taken together,
amount to a sizeable subsidy.210 The IRS, through its authority
to determine which organizations qualify under Section
501(c)(3), unlocks the door to these privileges and, thus, bears
the responsibility of safeguarding America’s charitable
subsidy.211 Imprecision in carrying out this responsibility leads
to misuse of the subsidy.
This misuse manifests in several different ways. A
straightforward and significant example is in the tax deduction
that Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code provides to
individual and corporate taxpayers who make contributions to
501(c)(3) organizations.212 Subject to certain limitations, the
deduction allows donors to deduct the value of their contributions
from their taxable income.213 The estimated five-year cost of this
deduction is $246.1 billion.214 This cost is borne by all U.S.
taxpayers because tax dollars foregone through the deduction
must be offset by other tax revenue. The greater the imprecision
in determining 501(c)(3) eligibility, the larger the portion of this
taxpayer-financed subsidy that is being misspent on and
incentivizing activity that is not really charitable.
The same point can be made with respect to the other
exemptions and privileges that federal law ties to 501(c)(3)
status, including (to name just a few) exemption from federal
unemployment taxes, the eligibility to issue tax-exempt bonds,

209 See,
e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 297-313 (4th ed. 2010) (summarizing the major theories which explain
the rationale for charitable tax advantages); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (“Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the
exempt entity confers a public benefit—a benefit which the society or the community may
not itself choose or be able to provide . . . .”).
210 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591 (“When the Government grants exemptions or
allows deductions all taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction for
the donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect and vicarious ‘donors.’”).
211 Id. at 596-97.
212 See I.R.C. § 170 (2006).
213 Id.
214 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010-2014 45-48 (2010).
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and preferred postal rates.215 It also applies to the ripple effect
that an organization’s 501(c)(3) status has at the state and
local levels: exemption from state and municipal income tax in
many jurisdictions is tied to 501(c)(3) status, as is eligibility for
many types of grants and contracts and, as at the federal level,
a wide array of other exceptions, exemptions, and privileges.216
Moreover, this imprecision has resulted to some degree
in the over-recognition of economic development organizations
under Section 501(c)(3) and, thus, overspends the charitable
subsidy. This is clearly the case for organizations that claim to
lessen governmental burdens, as the IRS has failed to utilize
the private benefit doctrine to filter out otherwise qualifying
organizations. It is probably also true for organizations that
claim to aid the distressed, as evidenced by the recent
proliferation of REDOs serving large geographic areas that are
often not predominantly distressed.217
The consequences of misuse, however, go beyond simply
misdirecting and/or over-spending the charitable subsidy. In
some cases, the availability of a particular component of the
charitable subsidy is limited and, thus, its support of noncharitable activities comes at the expense of support for
activities that are charitable. One example of this is grantmaking by charitable foundations, which is a substantial and
increasing source of support for economic development
organizations.218 In the aggregate, around 14% of all
contributions (approximately $41 billion) to 501(c)(3)
organizations come from private foundations which are obligated
to expend their funds in support of charitable purposes.219
Because most foundation trustees view preservation of the
foundation’s assets for future use as a part of their “duty of
care,” most foundations limit their annual grant-making and
other payouts to five percent of their assets, the minimum
payout required by the Internal Revenue Code for charitable
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 208, at 155-58.
Id.
217 See supra notes 11, 15 and accompanying text.
218 See, e.g., THE FOUND. CTR., supra note 13 (showing a 152% increase in
economic development grantmaking between 2005 and 2011, and also showing that, as
a share of total giving in Ohio, economic development grants doubled, from 7% to 14%
between 2005 and 2008).
219 GIVING USA FOUND., GIVING USA 2011 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE ANNUAL
REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2010 4 (2011) (showing private foundations
contributed about $41 billion to 501(c)(3) organizations in 2010, which accounted for
14% of all contributions); AM. CITY BUREAU, INC., OVERVIEW OF GIVING USA 2009 KEY
FINDINGS (2009) (showing private foundations contributed about $41 billion to 501(c)(3)
organizations in 2008, which accounted for about 13% of all contributions).
215

216
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foundations.220 Accordingly, the pool of foundation grants
available annually to 501(c)(3) organizations is limited and
grants that are made in support of non-charitable activities
necessarily decrease the amounts available for charitable
activities. In real terms, grants supporting REDOs that invest in
businesses may come at the expense of grants available for more
conventional charitable organizations like food banks, community
health centers, and afterschool arts programs.221 This is not a
problem if REDOs are properly scrutinized for 501(c)(3)
qualification, but it opens the door for a significant diversion of
funding intended for charitable purposes if they are not.
This diversion may negatively impact not only charities,
but for-profit businesses as well. Access to capital and the costs
associated with technical assistance and basic infrastructure
present huge challenges for most startup companies.
Organizations like REDOs utilize the charitable subsidy to help
certain companies overcome these challenges by providing
financing, office space, other forms of expertise, and
infrastructure below cost or, in some cases, at no cost.
Undoubtedly, this gives the businesses that are assisted a huge
leg up over competing firms. Again, if REDOs are properly
scrutinized to ensure a strong nexus between the businesses
they aid and the accomplishment of charitable purposes, this
leg up should be fully consistent with the purpose of subsidizing
charitable organizations. But if the activities of the organization
are not rigorously reviewed, businesses whose success bears little
connection to the accomplishment of charitable purposes will
benefit unjustifiably relative to all other businesses (not only
those whose success would accomplish charitable purposes, but
also those which simply face existing barriers to entering the
marketplace without taxpayer funded assistance).
In summary, the chief function of the IRS as it relates to
the charitable sector is to monitor who qualifies for 501(c)(3) status
to assure the public and donors that the charitable subsidy is
220 COMMONFUND INST., PRINCIPLES OF NONPROFIT INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
11
(2005),
available
at
https://www.commonfund.org/_catalogs/masterpage/
principlesofnonprofitinvestmgmt.pdf; AKASH DEEP & PETER FUMPKIN, THE FOUNDATION
PAYOUT PUZZLE 11 (2001), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hauser/PDF_
XLS/workingpapers/workingpaper_9.pdf.
221 Compare FOUND. CTR., supra note 13, with FOUND. CTR., SPOTLIGHT ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GRANTMAKING IN OHIO (Feb. 2008), http://foundcenter.org/
gainknowledge/research/pdf/spotlight_ohio_2008.pdf (showing that the increase in
economic development grantmaking as a share of total giving in Ohio between 2005
and 2008 resulted in a corresponding decrease in the percentage of grant dollars used
for other purposes).
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utilized for legitimate charitable purposes as the law has defined
them. Where the potential for significant misuse of this subsidy
exists, the IRS, Congress, or the courts must step in to address it.
V.

CRAFTING A SOLUTION FOR MORE EFFECTIVE
REGULATION OF CHARITABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A.

The Merits of a Well-Tailored Private Benefit Doctrine

This article’s principal contention is that a more
nuanced, consistent, and frequent application of the private
benefit doctrine to organizations engaged in charitable economic
development can help resolve all three of the concerns raised in
the previous section and better protect the charitable subsidy.
Calling upon the private benefit doctrine to add clarity to the
regulation of any category of 501(c)(3) organizations might at
first seem like a questionable proposition. The language serving
as the basis for the doctrine is awkwardly written and lacks
well-established
theoretical
boundaries
to
guide
its
application.222 The IRS Exempt Organizations Division—the
very department charged with enforcing the doctrine—concedes
that it can be difficult to apply as “decided cases provide only
broad bench-marks, with the result that the relevant facts in
each individual case must be strained through those
[established] principles to arrive at a decision on the particular
case.”223 Commentators and scholars have frequently battered
the doctrine and its application by the IRS,224 with some arguing
that it should be reined in or even abandoned altogether.225
Rather than throwing the private benefit doctrine under
the bus, however, it is worth noting that no one who criticizes
the doctrine really finds fault with the general premise that in
order for an organization to merit the charitable subsidy it must
primarily serve public interests.226 Criticism focuses instead on
how the doctrine is applied. Some question the recent significant
increase in the number of situations in which the IRS invokes
the doctrine, asserting that the malleability of the doctrine
222 See Colombo, supra note 86, at 1080 (“Indeed, the problem is that the
doctrine currently has no theoretical grounding to set its outer boundaries.”); see also
HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 540.
223 Megosh et al., supra note 179, at 140 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
224 HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 540; Jones, supra note 87, at 1002-05.
225 See Colombo, supra note 86, at 1065 (“In the past, I have expressed my
displeasure with the private benefit doctrine in writing, explicitly calling for its demise.”).
226 See Jones, supra note 87, at 998; see also Colombo, supra note 86, at 1067.
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allows the IRS to mold it to serve as a basis to oppose every new
interaction between a nonprofit and a private party that it does
not like.227 Others criticize the discretion the test provides to IRS
agents to grant or deny organizations 501(c)(3) status without
reference to a guiding principle. In words that aptly sum up this
point, one scholar referred to it as the “quintessential balancing
test under which the IRS both owns and reads the scale, leaving
charities completely at sea regarding the possible ill effects of
transactions with for-profit intermediaries.”228
While conceding that the above are valid criticisms, I
contend that the private benefit doctrine, when properly
refined and articulated, could serve as a clear and consistent
tool for the IRS to use in evaluating newly emerging types of
charities (like REDOs) in a vastly changing nonprofit world
that more closely resembles the private sector. The size,
sophistication, and scope of nonprofit organizations have
increased significantly in the last several decades.229 A
combination of increased responsibility caused by the
government’s gradual withdrawal from the direct provision of
social services, increased competition for dwindling public
sector and philanthropic dollars, and the increased professional
credentials of those working within the nonprofit sector has
resulted in an industry that is on the whole more selfsufficient, ambitious, and entrepreneurial.230 This, in turn, has
increased the influence of the private sector on how charities
operate. In the twenty-first century, nonprofits view fees
charged for services as an essential source of operational
income; create for-profit and nonprofit subsidiaries to partner
with private sector property developers and operate business
ventures; enter into complicated capital-raising vehicles in
cooperation with investment banks; and transfer valuable
rights in technology, research, and other intellectual property
to private companies with the capacity to commercialize these
assets and generate vast sums of profit. 231
See HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 540 (b).
Colombo, supra note 86, at 1065.
229 Alan J. Abramson & Rachel McCarthy, Infrastructure Organizations, in
THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA, 423 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
230 See generally Gerry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthro-capitalism, 61
CASE W. RES. U. L. REV. 753, 755 (2011) (describing recent pressures on nonprofit sector to
become more like private sector in its “capacity, efficiency, accountability and effectiveness”).
231 See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Doing Well By Doing Good and Vice Versa; Self
Sustaining NGO/Nonprofit Organizations, 17 J. L. & POL’Y 403, 424-33 (2009); see also
Kelley, supra note 26, at 2438-39 (discussing how nonprofits are expected to operate
like successful commercial enterprises).
227
228
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These are developments the IRS probably did not
foresee in 1959 when the language providing the basis for the
private benefit doctrine was formally adopted into the IRC
Regulations. And yet, this doctrine, among all of the other
language contained in Section 501(c)(3) and the IRC
Regulations, appears to be the most salient to the very concerns
raised as the private sector becomes increasingly intertwined
with the charitable domain. Its broad wording makes it
potentially adaptable to addressing unforeseen issues in an
ever more complex nonprofit world.
At the same time, there reaches a point when, as it
pertains to a particular category of 501(c)(3) organizations, the
facts and circumstances, gut-reaction style approach that the
IRS takes in applying the private benefit doctrine fails to
adequately regulate. When this approach leads to differing
results among similar organizations, does not provide adequate
guidance on which activities fall outside the definition of
charitable, or fails to ensure sufficient accountability, it must
be refined so that the doctrine better addresses the unique
issues raised by that subset of organizations. It is at this point
that Congress, the IRS, or the courts must step in to clarify and
sharpen the jurisprudence and/or reform the way the doctrine
is being applied. This has happened on several occasions in the
last decade, including for hospitals,232 private-sector joint
ventures,233 credit counseling organizations,234 and housing
down payment providers.235 The time has arrived for it to
happen for economic development organizations as well.
B.

Possible Strategies

Of course, the harder task is not acknowledging that the
private benefit doctrine must be better tailored for economic
development organizations, but determining how to do so. There
are a wide range of possible strategies, most of which would
require congressional legislation to amend Section 501 of the
Internal Revenue Code, an amendment to Treasury Department
regulations, an IRS Revenue Ruling, or a combination of these.
These possibilities (none of which are mutually exclusive) include:

232
233
234
235

I.R.C. § 501(r) (2010).
Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998 C.B. 718 (Mar. 23, 1998).
I.R.C. § 501(q) (2010).
Rev. Rul. 2006-27, 2006-21 I.R.B. 915, 2006-I.C.B. 915.
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1. Modernizing and Refining Jurisprudential
Standards
One obvious fix would be to modernize the standards set
forth in the 1970s-era Revenue Rulings. Through a Revenue
Ruling, the IRS could update these standards to clarify what
constitutes a distressed area, more fully define the types and
amounts of public benefit that must follow from aid to businesses,
and/or more explicitly characterize the required link between the
aid provided by organizations and the needs of the businesses
aided. Doing so would provide aspiring 501(c)(3) organizations
and the IRS with clearer, more relevant standards.
Of course, the IRS would face some hard choices in
deciding how to refine those standards. Should the standards
be more quantitative (for example, by imposing fixed
thresholds like the percentage of jobs created that must be
filled by low-income people who reside within an organization’s
service area), more qualitative (for example, by more explicitly
defining a distressed area or an appropriate charitable class for
economic development purposes) or a combination of the two?
The type of economic development an area needs depends on
the challenges it faces. Would more refined standards apply
uniformly or would they vary relative to specific socio-economic
challenges faced by the population served, indicators of distress,
or some other factor? Would standards vary according to the
activities engaged in by an organization (for example, should an
organization face job creation thresholds that are tied specifically
to the amount of money it invests in for-profit enterprises)?
These questions raise the larger issues of the extent to
which concepts like private and public benefit can even be
accurately measured, and whether imposing more narrowly
defined standards could actually result in excluding some
organizations that accomplish charitable ends. Finally, how
and to what extent would these standards apply to economic
development organizations that seek charitable status by
claiming to lessen the burdens of government? Would a
separate set of standards need to exist for these organizations
and on what basis would it be formulated?
2. Allowing Organizations to Formulate Their Own
Private/Public Benefit Standards
An alternative to formally and uniformly changing the
current IRS standards is to allow each economic development
organization seeking 501(c)(3) status to devise its own
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standards for accomplishing the appropriate balance between
public and private benefit and to justify them in its application
for recognition of 501(c)(3) status. This strategy recognizes that
economic development encompasses many different types of
activities in many different contexts and, thus, a one-size-fitsall solution may not be adequate. Great Britain uses this
approach in regulating its equivalent of charitable economic
development organizations.236
Although subject to the risk that an organization will
only craft a standard that it will meet, the fact that the
organization would have to explain and defend its standard in
its 1023 application ensures that the IRS would at least have
an opportunity to scrutinize the organization’s methodology.
This concern could also be addressed by requiring that the
organization provide objective data and/or third-party opinions
substantiating the validity of its standards.
3. Regulating Board Composition to Incorporate
Interests of the Charitable Class
An even more indirect method of addressing the
concerns identified in Part IV would be to require that the
board of directors (Board) of 501(c)(3) economic development
organizations consist of a majority of individuals selected from
the charitable class that the organization intends to serve.
Harkening back to the model utilized in Community Economic
Development, the reasoning is that a Board that is
representative of a charitable class will be less likely to stray
from the underlying mission of serving that class.237 In
isolation, this strategy involves neither change to the current
substantive standards comprising the private benefit doctrine
nor any increased role for the IRS. Instead, it relies heavily on
the Board—the constituent body charged with stewardship of
an organization’s charitable mission—to exercise judgment in
striking the right balance between the public and private
benefit generated by the organization’s activities.238

236 The Review of the Register of Charities: Promotion of Urban and Rural
Regeneration, Charity Commission (Mar. 1999), http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/
media/95169/rr2text.pdf.
237 See Clark, supra, note 43.
238 Members of nonprofit Boards of Directors owe a duty of obedience to carry
out the purposes of the organization as expressed in its articles of incorporation.
FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 209, at 198.
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Congress recently utilized a similar type of an approach
for 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations engaged in credit
counseling out of a concern that these organizations often
operate primarily to further the interests of for-profit companies
to which the organizations refer their clients.239 Congress added
501(q) to the Internal Revenue Code requiring that the Boards
of credit counseling organizations be “controlled” by “persons
who represent the broad interests of the public,” and limiting
how many Board members can be employed by the organization
or financial beneficiaries of its activities.240
4. Requiring Periodic Board Certification of Adequate
Public Benefit
This is another strategy that utilizes an economic
development organization’s Board to ensure that the
organization satisfies the private benefit doctrine. In this case, a
Board would be required to periodically review the activities of
the organization and determine whether these activities yield
the appropriate balance between public and private benefit.
Each Board member would then have to certify or dissent from a
statement that, in the Board’s opinion, the organization strikes
an appropriate balance. The organization would disclose the
results of this certification process on its annual Form 990.
This approach most closely reflects the spirit of
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms for publicly traded corporations241 and
it reinforces provisions in the IRS model conflict-of-interest
policy for Board members of 501(c)(3) organizations.242 The
onus is clearly on individual Board members to participate in
due diligence on an organization’s business assistance
programs and to understand the relevant jurisprudence of the
private benefit doctrine in order to have a reasonable basis for
making the certification. However, as with the immediately
preceding strategy, one might fairly question whether
individual Board members will have sufficient time and legal
acumen to effectively make these types of assessments.

I.R.C. § 501(q) (2010).
I.R.C. § 501 (q)(1)(D) (2010).
241 See A.B.A. COORDINATING COMM. ON NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE, GUIDE TO
NONPROFIT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE WAKE OF SARBANES-OXLEY 5-6 (2005).
242 See I.R.S., Instructions for Form 1023, Article VI (2013).
239

240
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5. Expanding Disclosure Requirements on the Annual
Information Return
The IRS could revise Form 990 to elicit more specific
information from economic development organizations about
their activities, including the names, types, and locations of
businesses they assist; the forms of aid they provide; the
number and types of jobs this aid creates; and other
information relevant to understanding the relative public and
private benefit generated by the organization’s activities. Form
990 currently contains several schedules to the main form
designed specifically for the purpose of gathering additional
information from particular types of organizations that
implicate regulatory concerns.243 For example, Schedule H to
Form 990 requires more detailed responses from hospitals
about the amount of charitable care and types of community
benefits they provide.244 This type of requirement for economic
development organizations would ensure that the IRS, the
general public and funders have detailed, consistent and up-todate information that serves as a basis for evaluating if an
organization satisfies the private benefit doctrine and, in this
way, increases the organization’s general accountability as it
relates to this issue. However, it does not necessarily increase the
likelihood that the IRS will make use of this data, as the agency
only examines a very small percentage of the 990s it receives.245
6. Providing for Periodic IRS Review of an
Organization’s 501(c)(3) Status
A more direct way of increasing accountability would be
to mandate that the IRS periodically review the 501(c)(3)
status of every economic development organization. This
strategy recognizes that the IRS can make a more accurate
assessment of how an organization complies with the private
benefit doctrine retrospectively, on the basis of actual data
I.R.S., Form 990, Part IV (2013).
I.R.S., Form 990, Schedule H (2013).
245 See Fishman, supra note 20, at 581 (citing STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT LAW RELATING TO CHARITABLE AND OTHER
EXEMPT ORGS. AND STATISTICAL INFO. REGARDING GROWTH AND OVERSIGHT OF THE
TAX-EXEMPT SECTOR 38 tbl.5 (2004), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-44-04.pdf)
(reporting that IRS is able to examine less than 2% of Form 990s filed); see also
Elizabeth Schwinn & Grant Williams, A Challenge for the IRS: Lack of Funds and
Manpower Taxes Agency’s Ability to Regulate Charities, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (Aug.
23, 2001), http://philanthropy.com/article/A-Challenge-for-the-IRS/54046/.
243
244
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about the organization’s operations, rather than just relying on
the organization’s projections in its Form 1023. It also ensures
that every organization at some point is called to account for
how it satisfies the doctrine. This is actually a familiar concept
in the economic development arena; government agencies
usually demand evidence of measurable results when they
provide job creation assistance to for-profit businesses, and often
claw back these benefits when a business does not carry through
on its projections.246 As for charities, recently Congress, as part
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, required that
the IRS review the tax exempt status of each 501(c)(3) hospital
every three years to ensure that it is providing an appropriate
level of charitable care.247 This review, the details of which are
still being worked out by the IRS, will amount to less than a
full re-examination of the organization and may focus
primarily on the disclosures the organization has made in its
annual Schedule H to Form 990.248
C.

Considerations

The strategies described above vary in terms of who
bears responsibility for carrying them out, the “cost” of
implementation, and the breadth of the standards, to name a
few. It is also critical to bear in mind the “harm” we are
attempting to resolve—the misuse of the charitable subsidy
caused by imprecision in determining when economic
development is charitable. Selecting and crafting one or more
strategies into an effective solution necessitates prioritizing
among these various considerations (some of which, when
considered alone, could lead to significantly different solutions).
In light of the concerns raised in this article, the following
considerations are the most important:

246 See Lerch, supra note 205 at 1-9. (discussing states’ passage of legislation
intended to provide greater accountability).
247 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9007(a),
124 Stat. 119, 855 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 501(r) (2010)).
248 Kurt Bennion, New Details on IRS Reviews of the Community Benefit
Activities of 501(c)(3) Hospitals, Clifton Larson Allen (Oct. 29, 2012), available at
http://www.cliftonlarsonallen.com/Health-Care/New-Details-on-IRS-Review-of-theCommunity-Benefit-Activities-of-501c3-Hospitals.aspx (last visited Apr. 23, 2013)
(reporting on revelation by IRS official in October 2012 that IRS will conduct “stealth”
reviews of one-third of hospitals every year based initially solely on their Form 990s
and other public records without notifying the hospitals when the reviews take place).
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1. Accuracy
One of this article’s central contentions is that the
jurisprudential standards the IRS employs in determining
when economic development is charitable are too outdated and
imprecise. They provide no established analytic structure for
evaluating economic development organizations, allowing IRS
agents to take a largely intuitive and discretionary approach to
applying the private benefit doctrine. This, in turn, has led to
outcomes that fail to meaningfully reflect the types of activities
Section 501(c)(3) should allow and prohibit. For a category of
organizations that provide aid to for-profit businesses with the
objective that benefit eventually trickles down to a charitable
class, the private benefit doctrine is not just a tangential
subplot, but rather the lead story line in whether or not the
organization is charitable. A sound solution should provide the
ultimate decision-maker with enough information and the
proper analytic tools to make good judgments about who is
entitled to the charitable subsidy. The decision maker also
needs to have the legal acumen and breadth of experience to
accurately determine when the doctrine is satisfied.
2. Consistency
Closely aligned with, and yet distinct from, accuracy is
consistency in decision-making to ensure that the private
benefit doctrine is given equal weight among all economic
development organizations seeking 501(c)(3) status. This is
critical to increasing the precision of the IRS in evaluating
these organizations. Furthermore, any perceived inconsistency
will undoubtedly lead to organizations seeking the path of least
resistance. For example, it is not difficult to imagine an
organization adding government officials to its board of
directors if organizations that lessen governmental burdens are
subject to less scrutiny under the private benefit doctrine.
3. Flexibility
Recognizing that different economic development
organizations provide different types of services (e.g. financing,
technical assistance, incubator space) to different types of
businesses (e.g. small retail stores, Biotech startups, growing
manufacturers) in geographical areas of different sizes and
facing different challenges, the ultimate solution needs to be
flexible enough to allow for the accomplishment of charitable
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economic development in a variety of circumstances. On the one
hand, flexibility in standards might be viewed as conflicting with
the preference for accuracy and consistency articulated in
considerations (1) and (2) above. On the other, however,
flexibility does not refer to how vigorously or consistently the
standards would be applied, but rather to creating an approach
that does not become so formulaic that it fails to accommodate
the wide range of economic development practices one might
fairly consider charitable. This consideration militates against
strict numeric tests (for example, 80% of jobs created must be
filled by low-income individuals) or narrowly drawn categories of
permissible activities (for example, below-market loans to
businesses owned exclusively by members of minority groups).
4. Accountability
Another central contention of this article is that there is
no real mechanism to hold an organization accountable with
respect to the private benefit doctrine after it has received
recognition of its 501(c)(3) status. As explained throughout this
article, the lack of ongoing accountability renders the doctrine
fairly meaningless for economic development organizations.
Any solution must address this problem. As with any
accountability mechanism, the solution must be carefully
crafted so that it elicits the right information and yet is not so
onerous that it discourages organizations from pursuing valid
charitable objectives or significantly detracts from their ability
to accomplish them.
5. Sensitivity to Regulatory Resources
Although an annual review by the IRS of the activities
of every one of the country’s over one million 501(c)(3)
organizations would no doubt increase the agency’s precision in
determining which organizations merit 501(c)(3) status, it
would tax the resources of the IRS Exempt Organizations
Division well beyond capacity.249 Any solution that requires
249 Fishman, supra note 20, at 581 (citing STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT LAW RELATING TO CHARITABLE AND OTHER
EXEMPT ORGS. AND STATISTICAL INFO. REGARDING GROWTH AND OVERSIGHT OF THE
TAX-EXEMPT SECTOR 38 table 5 (2004), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-4404.pdf) (reporting that IRS is able to examine less than 2% of Form 990s filed); see also
Elizabeth Schwinn & Grant Williams, A Challenge for the IRS: Lack of Funds and
Manpower Taxes Agency’s Ability to Regulate Charities, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY
(Aug. 23, 2001), http://philanthropy.com/article/A-Challenge-for-the-IRS/54046/.
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more agency involvement will result in some increase in
administrative costs and the greater the scope of this
involvement, the more unlikely the IRS will be able to bear it.
Similarly, a solution that shifts the regulatory burden to others
(like Boards) must take into account the challenges this would
pose to the organizations at issue in identifying Board
members with the time and expertise to play this role. So,
accountability must be balanced with regulatory cost.
VI.

THE SOLUTION

As argued throughout this article, the problem with the
current approach to assessing place-based economic
development as charitable is multi-faceted and, thus, so is the
solution. It involves corresponding changes to both the current
jurisprudence and to the practices the IRS utilizes in evaluating
and monitoring economic development organizations with a
primary objective of improving the agency’s precision in
determining which ones are charitable while staying mindful of
the other considerations prioritized in Section V.
My recommended solution includes the following features:
(a) the formal adoption by the IRS of more nuanced
standards for evaluating charitable place-based
economic development emphasizing more clearly the
need for a strong nexus between the aid the
organization provides to businesses and the direct
alleviation of community economic distress;
and
(b) an enhanced process that all place-based economic
development organizations claiming 501(c)(3) status
must adhere to so that the IRS is better equipped to
apply the standards described in part (a) above both
when the organization applies for 501(c)(3) status
and on an ongoing basis. This process would include:
•

the submission by the organization of (i) a
written community economic hardship
assessment, identifying specific hardships
related to the growth, attraction, or
retention of businesses in the particular
community the organization aims to
serve, and (ii) a detailed action plan
explaining with specificity how the
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organization’s activities will address the
hardships identified in this assessment,
•

which are reviewed by the IRS at the time of
the organization’s application for 501(c)(3)
status and periodically thereafter, and

•

which are reported on annually in the
organization’s Form 990 via a separate
schedule.

This solution combines several of the possible strategies
discussed in Part V(B). and it bears some resemblance to the
new framework for the regulation of 501(c)(3) hospitals
recently implemented by the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (the PPACA),250 with a heightened sensitivity to
minimizing the additional regulatory burden on the IRS. A
discussion of each of the critical features follows below.
A.

Updating the Standards

As the primary arbiters of which organizations are
recognized as charities, it is important that IRS agents have
clear markers for making these determinations, especially
when dealing with categories of organizations that present a
regulatory challenge. Part III(A) of this article points to
difficulties in applying all aspects of the IRS’s 1970s era
jurisprudential standards to modern day REDOs. While
effectively modernizing these standards is easier said than
done, good starting points would be for the IRS to (1) formally
require that an economic development charity provide objective
evidence that the entire area it plans to serve is suffering from
economic distress, and (2) formally adopt a standard akin to
the expanded analysis contained in its long cast-aside 1992
General Counsel Memorandum referenced in Part III(A).251
This Memorandum provided that an economic development
charity must show a strong nexus between the businesses it
will aid and addressing the specific economic hardships
encountered by the area it will serve.
As to the first suggestion, the goal is to provide IRS
agents with some objective basis for distinguishing between
250 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of the United States Code and Internal Revenue Code).
251 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,883 (Oct. 16, 1992).
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areas of the country that are in need of some form of charitable
economic aid from those that are not. In its current
instructions to the application for recognition of 501(c)(3)
status, the IRS hints that this may already be a part of its
practice. The instructions suggest that an economic
development organization that seeks to “combat community
deterioration” should describe whether the area in which it
plans to operate “ha[s] been declared blighted or economically
depressed by a government finding” and, if it has not, consider
whether an exemption under another subpart of Section 501(c)
is more appropriate.252 Expressly adopting, in a Revenue
Ruling, a threshold like this as part of a test for qualifying as a
charity makes good sense, as does broadening it to include
similar findings by objective, third-party experts like qualified
universities and research institutions. It establishes that, at a
minimum, place-based charitable economic development must
be directed at places suffering actual distress, and sets a
baseline for what qualifies as adequate substantiation of this
fact. Another alternative would be to tie the threshold more
narrowly to a definition of economic distress in a particular
statute or to a particular type of government finding. However,
this may run the risk of too narrowly constraining the range of
circumstances that constitute distress.
The second suggestion addresses a critical concern
identified in Part IV(A) by requiring that an economic
development organization like a REDO demonstrate that it has
carefully tailored its assistance to for-profit enterprises to best
meet the needs of the distressed in the area it serves. General
Counsel Memorandum 39,883 contains the strongest IRS
statement to date that a more liberal form of trickle down
charity (essentially, aiding any businesses in a distressed area
on the theory that increased economic activity in and of itself
will produce some degree of public benefit) is not charity.253
This Memorandum also emphasized the need for two additional
“nexus characteristics” in order to demonstrate eligibility for
501(c)(3) status: (1) the assistance provided to businesses must
not be available from conventional sources because of the
depressed nature of the area, and (2) the businesses aided must
offer the “greatest community potential benefit” based on the
problems experienced by that area.254
252
253
254

I.R.S., Instructions for Form 1023, Part VIII, line 6a (2006).
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,883 (Oct. 16, 1992).
Id.
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Within these characteristics reside standards that are
clearer for aspiring economic development charities to
demonstrate satisfaction of, and for IRS agents to apply. First,
the organization must show a shortage or inadequacy of
whatever assistance it plans to provide to area businesses and
that this shortfall is a result of location in an economically
distressed area. One could conceive of an organization
demonstrating this by comparing resources in the area it plans
to serve to those of more economically prosperous areas. Second,
the organization must demonstrate a strong link between the
businesses it aids and the particular forms of distress suffered
by the area it serves. General Counsel Memorandum 39,883
use of the phrase “greatest community benefit”255 indicates that
an incidental or even a moderate link between the businesses
aided and the problems faced by the community at issue is not
enough; the nexus must be strong. The organization should be
able to show that the success of the businesses it aids will have a
clearly measurable and important impact on those suffering the
effects of economic distress in the area it serves.
Up until this point, discussion of this change in
standards has focused on economic development organizations
that seek 501(c)(3) status on the basis of aiding distressed people
and places. For organizations like these, there is fairly clear
logic to imposing the more exacting standards discussed above.
But what about those REDOs that claim to lessen
governmental burdens? These types of charities are also
governed by the private benefit doctrine; but they can argue that
they achieve considerable public benefit simply by reducing the
cost of government to taxpayers.256 The charitable class of an
organization like this conceivably includes all citizens, not just
those that are distressed.
However, the private benefit doctrine does not assess
public benefit alone. It assesses public benefit relative to
private benefit.257 Economic development practices that provide
assistance directly to private businesses yield substantial
private benefit. As a result, if the quantitative component of
the private benefit doctrine is to have any meaning, these
Id.
See Lars Gustafsson, “Lessening the Burdens of Government”: Formulating a Test
for Uniformity and Rational Federal Income Tax Subsidies, 45 U. KAN. L. REV 787, 833 (1997)
(suggesting that the application of the private benefit doctrine may be unnecessary for
organizations able to demonstrate that they lessen governmental burdens as this
demonstration itself should already suffice in satisfying the private benefit doctrine).
257 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii) (2008).
255
256
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practices must yield public benefit so significant that, by
comparison, the private benefit appears insubstantial.258
Reducing the cost of government, expanding the local tax base,
and promoting business activity for the economic betterment of
all those who reside in a community provide some measure of
public benefit and, as a matter of law, usually provide
sufficient justification to support the economic development
acts of government, which are not subject to the private benefit
doctrine.259 Nevertheless, the limited case law and IRS
guidance available on this point indicate that the private
benefit doctrine applicable to charities demands more.260
I propose that the more exacting standards I propose
above for economic development organizations that aid the
distressed should also apply to those that lessen the burdens of
government. In other words, an organization that directly aids
private businesses and seeks 501(c)(3) status for doing so
should first have to demonstrate that the area it serves suffers
from some form of distress that prevents it from attracting
businesses and creating jobs, even if the organization’s sole
claim to charitable status is that it lessens governmental
burdens. The rationale for requiring this is firmly rooted in the
myriad theories underlying the existence of the charitable
subsidy. These theories, as noted earlier, can be collectively
understood as justifying the subsidy as necessary to incentivize
the provision of meritorious and publicly beneficial goods and
services that other segments of society are unwilling or unable to
provide.261 In economically healthy regions, one would expect that
emerging and existing businesses with strong potential for growth
attract capital, technical assistance, and other resources from
banks, venture capital firms, and other private sector players on
commercially reasonable terms. Private sector players in these
regions are already sufficiently incentivized and able to determine
which businesses are viable and to provide them with the

See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862.
See Anne C. Choe, Blinson v. State and the Continued Erosion of the Public
Purpose Doctrine in North Carolina, 87 N.C. L. REV. 644 (2009) (discussing the “public
purpose doctrine” that governs the economic development activities of government).
260 See Quality Auditing Co. v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 498, 510 (2000) (private benefit
doctrine provides an “exception” to rule that organizations that lessen governmental
burden fulfill charitable purposes); see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,693 (Apr. 15,
1981) (casting doubt on whether organization that promotes local economic development
would qualify under 501(c)(3) even if it in fact lessened governmental burdens due to
amount of benefit businesses receive from organization’s activities).
261 See supra note 209.
258
259
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necessary resources to launch. Thus, there is no need to subsidize
charitable organizations to play this role.
Furthermore, using the charitable subsidy to incentivize
the creation and attraction of jobs in already healthy economies
may undermine other efforts to create and attract jobs in regions
with distressed economies. Federal tax credits, exemptions, and
other programs aimed at job creation and business formation are
usually directed toward areas experiencing some level of
economic distress.262 Simultaneously utilizing the charitable
subsidy, which is largely federally funded, to aid the efforts of
state and local governments to increase commercial activity in
areas with healthy economies seems contradictory.
A similar sentiment is often reflected in court cases and
IRS materials addressing 501(c)(3) organizations that drift too
far into territory where the private sector is functioning
normally. In one of the few publicly available IRS rulings
applying the private benefit doctrine to an organization
claiming to lessen governmental burdens, the IRS opined,
“because the activity engaged in by the subject organization is
in a general area which is traditionally commercial (although
the subject organization may very well be non-commercial),
extreme caution should be exercised before an exempt status is
awarded.”263 In a similar vein, the IRS stressed to its agents
that they use “extreme caution” whenever asked by an
economic development organization to approve its 501(c)(3)
status using “a lessening the burdens rationale,” presumably
out of a concern that it is difficult to justify activity that simply
aims to promote commerce as charitable.264 As a general
matter, courts and the IRS have interpreted Section 501(c)(3)
to altogether exclude organizations that conduct activities
substantially similar to those conducted by for-profit
businesses or that operate with a distinctive “commercial hue”
(this is known as the “commerciality doctrine”).265
Nonetheless, the IRS has not yet incorporated this
sentiment into anything resembling a meaningful standard for
economic development organizations that base their claim to
charitable status on lessening the burdens of government.
Requiring this type of an organization to show that the area it
plans to serve is distressed is a good starting point for making
See Simon, supra note 8, at 380.
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,685 (Sept. 17, 1986).
264 Louthian & Friedlander, supra note 177, at 8.
265 See, e.g., Airlie Found. v. I.R.S., 283 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2003); B.S.W.
Group, Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352 (1978).
262

263
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a case that it satisfies the private benefit doctrine as it clearly
links aid to private businesses with a substantiated public
need. To make a full case the organization would have to show,
like the organizations basing their claim on aiding the
distressed, a strong nexus between the businesses it aids and
improving economic distress.
B.

Improving the Process

Holding economic development organizations to higher
and more nuanced standards requires that those organizations
provide the IRS with more and better information about their
objectives and activities. Accordingly, my recommended solution
requires that this type of an organization submit a (1)
community economic hardship assessment and (2) action plan,
which would be reviewed by the IRS upon application for
501(c)(3) status. Furthermore, the organization would annually
report on the accomplishment of its action plan in its Form 990
and the IRS would periodically review these reports. More detail
about each of the key aspects of this approach follows below:
1. Community Economic Hardship Assessment
This is a concept borrowed from the PPACA, which
requires that a hospital prepare an assessment of the health
needs of the community, which it serves every three years in
order to be treated as a charitable 501(c)(3) organization.266
Economic development organizations seeking charitable status
should likewise have to engage in an assessment of the
conditions for business creation, cultivation, and retention in
the communities they plan to serve. A critical distinction here
is that the organization would have to identify more than just
the “need” for jobs or companies within the community; every
community wants and arguably needs more business activity
and better jobs. The assessment would have to include a
government finding or other objective third-party opinion
(described in Part VI(A) above) that the area the organization
will serve suffers from economic distress. The assessment
would also have to describe the specific hardships that result
from this distress—like unusually high unemployment or
poverty rates, unusually low educational attainment statistics,
significant numbers of blighted properties, or other hardships
266

I.R.C. §§ 501(r)(1)(A) and (3)(A)(i) (2010).
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within the community intended to be served—as a foundation
for justifying the types of businesses the organization will aid.
The community could be defined by geography or by
demographically identifiable segments of a population
experiencing a hardship. The community could occupy areas
large or small; the focus during the organization’s IRS review
would be on the severity and pervasiveness of the hardship
faced by the identified area rather than necessarily on the size
of the area served. At the same time, however, as discussed
below, the organization will need to show that the businesses it
plans to aid will have a direct and measurable impact on
alleviating the identified hardships.
2. Action Plan
Another concept borrowed from the new framework for
regulating 501(c)(3) hospitals is that of an action plan closely
linking the activities of the organization to the community
hardships identified in the assessment.267 This is how the
organization will demonstrate that it meets the “strong nexus”
requirement. For example, if the hardship is that a community
is experiencing high unemployment due to a poorly educated
work force, the organization’s action plan would need to show
how the businesses it plans to aid would alleviate this
particular type of unemployment.
The action plan would also need to include projections
quantifying the value of the aid the organization plans to offer
to businesses and the charitable economic impact of this aid.
This type of information is commonly requested by government
agencies that make grants, loans, tax abatements, and/or tax
credits to for-profit businesses as a way of rationalizing the
decisions the agencies make.268 It is reasonable to expect that
501(c)(3) economic development organizations would likewise
provide some evidence of the charitable value generated by the
tax subsidy they receive and pass along to for profit enterprises.
The requirements for the community economic hardship
assessment and action plan are closely tied to satisfying the
updated standards articulated in Part VI(A) and, by so doing,
the private benefit doctrine. These requirements add critical
content that the IRS can utilize to determine whether the
qualitative and quantitative components of the doctrine are
267
268

I.R.C. § 501(r)(3)(A)(ii) (2010).
See, e.g., Lerch, supra note 205.
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satisfied. The qualitative component requires that any private
benefit be a “necessary concomitant” of the public benefit
achieved.269 Requiring a clear identification of community
hardships and an action plan that establishes a clear nexus to
resolution of those hardships helps to satisfy this component.
Requiring that an organization make a rough calculation of the
private and public benefit its activities achieve provides a more
substantive and consistent format for satisfying the quantitative
component.270 At the same time, these requirements help to
satisfy the preference for flexibility described in Part V(C)(3). The
assessment and action plan would allow an organization to craft a
unique portfolio of programming and intended outcomes to best
match the economic hardships faced by the community it serves.
3. Subject to Initial and Subsequent Periodic IRS
Reviews
A charitable economic development organization would
submit its community economic hardship assessment and
action plan when it applies for 501(c)(3) status. Recognition by
the IRS of the organization’s 501(c)(3) status would essentially
constitute an endorsement by the IRS that, if the organization
conducts its activities consistent with these documents, it
satisfies the private benefit doctrine. If the organization were
to make any material change to either of these documents, it
would need to submit the updated versions with its annual
Form 990. In this way, economic development charities would
be treated similarly to other 501(c)(3) organizations except in
terms of the amount of information required.271 In recognition,
however, of the increased need for long-term accountability by
charities engaged in economic development, the IRS would
periodically re-examine the 501(c)(3) status of all economic
development organizations on a rolling basis.
This feature, of course, raises a concern about IRS
resources.272 Relying instead on the boards of these
organizations, the general public, and/or funders to monitor
their activities, as several of the other strategies discussed in
Part V do, are certainly cheaper alternatives for achieving some
measure of long-term accountability. These alternative
See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991).
Id.
271 I.R.S., Form 990, Part III, Line 2 (requiring that an organization report
significant additions to its services).
272 See supra note 245.
269

270
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strategies raise other difficulties, however. It is unlikely that
Board members or the general public possess the legal acumen
necessary to accurately assess an organization’s activities
under the private benefit doctrine. Board members might be
inclined to support an organization in any case as a matter of
self-interest or to avoid undermining an organization in which
they are heavily involved. Individual members of the general
public cannot impose significant consequences on an organization
that fails to satisfy the private benefit doctrine. While funders can
cease providing financial support, this assumes that the funders
are inclined to make this type of review and carry through on
consequences, which, while plausible, is less certain and
consistent than if the IRS plays a prominent role.
The recognition by an organization that it will have its
501(c)(3) status re-examined by the IRS at certain points in its
lifespan creates a higher measure of accountability, but at a
higher cost. To an extent, it is fair to expect the IRS to devote
the level of resources necessary to carry out its responsibility
as gate keeper of the charitable subsidy. At the same time,
however, this cost can be contained to an extent by limiting the
scope of the IRS review solely to the organization’s compliance
with the private benefit doctrine. Most, if not all, of the
information necessary to conduct this review—that is, any
updates to the community economic hardship assessment and
action plan and yearly reports on the organization’s
accomplishment of the action plan (which enhanced 990
reporting will provide as described below)—would already be in
the hands of the IRS. Finally, because the reviews would be
done on a rolling basis rather than according to a fixed
schedule, the IRS would have flexibility in terms of how often it
conducts these reviews.
4. Reported on Form 990
The principal reporting mechanism to ensure an
economic development organization’s accountability under the
private benefit doctrine would be a specialized schedule that
the organization would need to complete each year and attach
to its Form 990. The schedule would elicit specific information
related to the organization’s accomplishment of the objectives
set forth in its action plan including, for example, the names
and types of businesses the organization aided during the
previous year, the forms of assistance it provided, criteria for
determining eligibility for assistance, and statistics on the
number and types of jobs created as a result of this assistance.
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In addition to making it easier for the IRS to periodically
review the organization, the schedule would provide some
measure of accountability by the organization to the general
public and funders. Furthermore, the process of having to
review its operations each year with respect to the specific
objectives set out in its community economic hardship
assessment and action plan, and report on this to the IRS and
the general public should serve to continually refocus the
organization on the basis for its charitable status.
CONCLUSION
By its own terms, the private benefit doctrine defies
precise application. Yet there are circumstances, ever
increasingly as the intersection of the private and charitable
sectors expand, where a primarily intuitive, one-time application
of the doctrine falls short and risks serious misuse of our
nation’s charitable subsidy. Such is the case with “charitable”
economic development where aid from charities to for-profit
businesses must trickle down to charitable beneficiaries. At the
same time that charitable economic development poses a special
regulatory challenge for the IRS, it also plays a vital role in the
revitalization of our nation’s distressed regions that should not
be discouraged by imposing overly burdensome regulation. The
solution proposed in Part VI helps to more effectively assess
when economic development is charitable in the way the law
intends, and ensure that organizations that engage in it are
accountable over their entire lifespan, without hindering their
performance of charitable work.

